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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay analyzes the effects of fixed
costs in generating country pairs that do not trade or do foreign direct investment,
and how incorporating such country pairs changes the welfare gains one computes from
policy reform. Despite the enormous growth over the past several decades in global
trade and investment, most countries still do not trade or invest with one other. Using
a recently commissioned dataset, I document that 80% of bilateral trade and FDI rela-
tionships are zeros. I construct a model that rationalizes these zeros and allows bilateral
relationships to form (aggregate zero-to-one transitions) following policy reform. Exact
equilibria do not generically exist in the resulting multidimensional discrete-choice fixed
point problem. I develop an algorithm that computes an approximate equilibrium where
(1) countries engage in more than 99% of all profitable bilateral relationships available
to them, and (2) where 99% of the bilateral relationships they engage in yield positive
profits. Relative to models with no aggregate entry or exit, the gains from openness
in the model where zeros matter are higher by 30% on average, with the discrepancy
larger for countries in the developing world.
In the second essay, I study the impact of international trade on the rise of the ser-
vice economy. Services now constitute the majority of both value added and labor in the
developed world, and its share is rising still. Trade in services, however, comes nowhere
near that level as a fraction of aggregate trade, with few service providers exporting
to foreign destinations. Moreover, while productivity growth in services as a whole has
lagged behind the rest of the economy, service exporters are more productive, sell more,
and hire more workers than their domestic counterparts. I construct a Heckscher-Ohlin
model where firms have heterogeneous productivity levels and show that the asymmetric
iii
lowering of trade barriers across sectors can qualitatively ac- count for all these facts.
The model predicts that labor in skill-abundant countries should move into services. It
also features endogenous selection into export markets, with exporters being more pro-
ductive, selling more, and making more profits than domestic producers. Furthermore,
as barriers to service trade remain high relative to non-services, the positive effect that
foreign competition in the model has on sector- level average productivity is weaker,
generating slower growth in service productivity. These results are shown to be robust
to the introduction of intermediates and capital.
In the third essay, I examine the role of debt auctions on quantitative models of
sovereign default. Government bonds with default risk are often sold by auction,
whether competitive or discriminatory. In standard models of sovereign default, the
pricing protocol stipulates the existence of perfectly informed risk-neutral foreign credi-
tors with flat demand curves that price bonds uniformly so they break even in expected
value. In contrast, this paper follows the auction literature in assuming that creditors
face downward sloping demand curves and uncertainty over the stop-out price at which
bonds are sold. The interaction of this auction component with default risk has a sig-
nificant impact on both the level of government borrowing and probability of default.
Further, the auction mechanism matters: if bonds are sold using a competitive auc-
tion, it is optimal for lenders to bid their true valuation; in contrast, agents have an
incentive to understate their valuation under a discriminatory auction protocol. Under-
standing the tradeoffs inherent in the choice between competitive and discriminatory
bond auctions in the presence of default are particularly pertinent for countries that
have historically been vulnerable to sovereign debt crises.
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Chapter 1
Zeros and the Gains from
Openness
1.1 Introduction
Globalization has been one of the most important developments of the past half century.
Global merchandise trade as a fraction of total output has risen more than twofold
in the last four decades (World Trade Organization database) while global FDI as a
fraction of total output has risen more than fivefold in the corresponding period (United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development STAT). Yet for all this growth the vast
majority of bilateral trade and FDI relationships remain full of zeros, i.e. there are
no documented flows from one country to the other. Using data from the recently
commissioned Coordinated Investment Survey Database and the Direction of Trade
Statistics Database, I document that in the period 2009-2011, more than 80% of bilateral
trade-FDI relationships in a global sample of over 100 countries contained at least one
zero. This raises two key questions: Why do some countries trade and do FDI with
each other, but not with others? And if globalization creates winners and losers because
1
2countries only trade or conduct FDI selectively, what do countries really stand to gain
from openness?
To address these questions, I develop a model that has both trade and multinational
production (MP) and allows for zeros in both. The basic framework is a multi-country
monopolistic competition model, where the number of firms engaging in production is
fixed, but the number of firms doing MP and exporting is endogenous. To engage in
either MP or exports, firms have to pay both fixed and variable iceberg costs. These
costs are country-pair specific and are the main source of heterogeneity in the model.
The asymmetry in fixed costs is critical to generating the pattern of zeros observed in
the data: firms only enter destinations where profits exceed fixed costs and do not enter
otherwise. Given that firms from a given country are homogeneous in productivity,
when one firm decides not to enter a particular destination, so do all other firms from
the same country, resulting in an aggregate zero in either trade or MP. Exporting firms
are distinct from firms that do multinational production, and hence countries could be
doing both trade and MP, only trade, only MP or neither - as they do in the data.
The gains from openness I consider are a result of a combination of trade and finan-
cial liberalization, where trade liberalization comes about with a fall in iceberg trade
costs, and similarly for financial liberalization and iceberg MP costs, holding fixed costs
and everything else constant. The presence of multiple discrete choices (trade, not trade)
and (MP, not MP) across all country pairs make computation of equilibrium difficult,
and exact equilibria where firms enter when it is profitable to do so and not otherwise
do not always exist. I develop an approximate equilibrium concept and an algorithm
to compute such equilibria. In the baseline parameterization, I compute approximate
equilibria that are 99% accurate in that (1) countries engage in more than 99% of all
profitable bilateral relationships available to them, and (2) of the bilateral relationships
they engage in, more than 99% yield positive profits. To assess the impact of zeros, I
3compare the results obtained given the baseline parameterization with aggregate zero-
to-one transitions (i.e. the formation of bilateral trade or MP relationships) against
an alternative parameterization where such transitions never occur. I find that relative
to this alternative parameterization, my model generates welfare gains that are 30%
higher for the average country, with the discrepancy larger for countries in the develop-
ing world. Decomposing these gains into trade and MP, I find that the contribution of
MP is larger for the majority of countries in my sample. These two findings suggest in-
cluding MP and allowing for aggregate zero-to-one transitions matter for understanding
what countries stand to gain from openness.
The gains from openness I consider in this paper have a long history in both trade
and FDI literatures. In light of the aforementioned growth in these flows, there has been
a resurgence in interest in understanding what drives these gains on both theoretical
and empirical fronts. On the trade side, Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012)
show that the gains from trade arising in the context of a wide array of models depend
only on two statistics: the import penetration ratio and the trade elasticity. On FDI,
McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and McGrattan (2012) find that while the gains from
FDI are large, the effects of FDI on growth are harder to ascertain. These papers focus
on a single channel, whether trade or FDI; in contrast, my objective is to study both,
and in particular, to account for the zeros observed in their bilateral flows and the effects
zeros turning to non-zeros have on welfare. Ramondo and Rodriguez Clare (2013) build
on the seminal work of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and study the gains from openness
in a model where countries have a motive to engage in both trade and MP, while
abstracting from the zeros in both types of flows. I view my work as complementary
to theirs. Earlier work on the interaction between trade and FDI is vast: Costinot and
Rodriguez-Clare (2013) and Antras and Yeaple (2013) in their suveys detail the evolution
4of this work.1 More recently, Irarrazabal, Moxnes and Opromolla (2012), building
on Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011), account for intrafirm trade using detailed data
on exporting and multinational firms from Norway. In a similar vein, Tintelnot (2013)
studies global export platforms and estimates his model using German firm-level data;
his subsequent analysis on the effects of liberalization are confined to a sample of 12
European and North American countries, where aggregate zeros are minimal. These
firm- and industry-level studies typically focus on firms from a particular country or
industries from the group of developed economies; my study, on the other hand, focuses
on the variation in entry and sales patterns across countries, with particular emphasis
on the zeros in the bilateral relationships between countries big and small.
The preponderance of zeros in the data has naturally piqued the interest of re-
searchers in the past. However, most of the analysis has been empirical in nature
and focus on the econometric issues that arise in the estimation of gravity-type equa-
tions given such nonlinearities. Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) employ an
instrumental variables approach that allows them to demonstrate the significance of the
inclusion of firm-level heterogeneity in the estimation of a gravity-type model. Santos
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) emphasizes the difference between gravity estimates obtained
from a poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator and those obtained using ordinary
least squares. In contrast, because my goal is to quantify the gains from openness in
a world with zeros, I perform my analysis within the context of a general equilibrium
model so as to be able to conduct policy experiments.2
1 e.g. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl (2012), Markusen
(1984), Brainard (1997), Rob and Vettas (2003), Fillat and Garetto (2010), Keller and Yeaple (2009),
Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001), Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006), Alfaro and Charlton (2009),
Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2013), Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2009)
2 Another related strand of the literature looks at the different specifications for the gravity equation
that account for the dispersion in (positive) trade flows between countries. Anderson and van-Wincoop
(2003) provide a recent treatment of the symmetric case where they show that the gravity equation
has theoretical underpinnings when one accounts for the multilateral resistance terms that represent
average trade barriers. There are two alternative asymmetric specifications: one with importer effects
as in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and another with exporter effects as in Waugh (2008). Here I show
5My model builds on the seminal work of Krugman (1979), which Arkolakis, Demi-
dova, Klenow and Rodriguez Clare (2008) extend by allowing for endogenous entry;
here I adopt exogenous entry where the measure of potential firms is fixed a la Chaney
(2008). In contrast to Chaney (2008), however, I parameterize the fixed costs so that
zero-to-one transitions following policy reform are observed in equilibrium. This results
in a multidimensional discrete-choice fixed point problem, that analogous to pure strat-
egy Nash equilibria, does not always admit an exact solution. In the spirit of Krusell and
Smith (1998), I develop an algorithm that computes an approximate equilibrium. In
this environment, the analogue of the average capital stock are cutoff rules that differ by
country-pair type: for any destination country, firms from source countries with higher
productivity will enter before lower productivity firms, and conversely, firms from source
countries with lower productivity exit before higher productivity firms. This parame-
terization of the policy functions give rise to price indices and profits that when taken as
given by agents, results in agents making the right entry decisions over 99% of the time.
Along this dimension my paper is closest to Ruhl (2008), who also computes an approx-
imate equilibrium albeit in the context of a very different environment with aggregate
uncertainty. One takeaway from my paper is that computation of such approximate
equilibria does not require the presence of aggregate uncertainty; the paradigm of us-
ing decision rules that are approximately correct can be used to solve other types of
problems that require agents to make decisions conditional on aggregate objects that
depend on the decisions of a large distribution of heterogeneous agents.
There has been renewed interest in the new varieties that arise as a result of trade,
with its concomitant effects on welfare. Kehoe and Ruhl (2013) find that increased
trade in the set of least-traded goods accounts for a significant fraction of trade growth
that Waugh’s results are robust to the larger sample that I consider and further provide an extension
to multinational production by applying the same methodology to show that source country effects get
the model closest to matching the correlation between prices and income across countries observed in
the data.
6following trade liberalization and similar structural breaks.3 Building on the work of
Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan (2010), Hornok and Koren (2012) show that admin-
istrative trade costs associated with shipping goods across borders result in lumpiness
that reduces welfare as shipments do not necessarily coincide with the preferred tim-
ing of agents’ consumption. Armenter and Koren (2013) propose a statistical model
with balls and bins to account for the large number of zeros in international shipments
when they are mapped against product categories. Eaton, Kortum and Sotelo (2012)
show that the standard heterogeneous-firm model can be modified to generate an inte-
ger number of firms and as a result account well for the zeros in bilateral trade data.
Relative to these papers, my work focuses on the aggregate (i.e. country-level) zeros in
both trade and multinational production. The message that zeros matter for welfare
remains.4
The next section presents the key empirical facts. Section 3 presents the model I
construct to accounts for these facts. The quantitative analysis is discussed in Section
4, and the main results are shown in Section 5. The last section concludes. Table and
figures can be found in a separate section following the main references. All proofs
are relegated to Appendix A. Appendix B contains a description of the algorithm. A
two-country example of an approximate equilibrium is presented in Appendix C.
3 Arkolakis (2010) constructs a model where trade liberalization results in a large increase in the
trade of goods with previously low volumes of trade. Evenett and Venables (2002) and Hummels and
Klenow (2005) find evidence of the importance of the extensive margin for trade growth. Feenstra (1994)
and Broda and Weinstein (2006) find that ignoring the extensive margin from additional varieties results
in prices that are too high and welfare that is too low.
4 di-Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) show that for a trade model with firm-level heterogeneity, zeros
at the firm-level matter little for welfare if the firm-size distribution follows Zipf’s Law. To rationalize
these seemingly opposing results, it suffices to note that in their case, policy would also have a big
impact if it affected the infra-marginal firms (which it would in my world with aggregate zeros) instead
of simply affecting lower-productivity firms who are at the cutoff.
71.2 Zeros in the Data
To construct the database of global bilateral trade and FDI flows, I merge data from
two main sources: the Coordinated Investment Survey Database and the Direction of
Trade Statistics. The Coordinated Investment Survey Database is a recent initiative by
the IMF that was commissioned for the purpose of reconciling differences between the
reported bilateral FDI flows by reporter and partner countries; this is my main source
for bilateral FDI data, and it runs from 2009-2011. Due to the lag in reporting nationial
data to the international organization performing the survey, the 2009 vintage of the
Coordinated Investment Survey Database is most complete and will be the focus of this
study. Statistics for 2010 and 2011 are very similar and will not be considered in this
paper. The bilateral trade data come from the Direction of Trade Statistics Database.
Merging these two datasets, I obtain bilateral trade and FDI flows data for over 100
countries.
Given that bilateral trade and multinational production can either be positive or
zero, there are four cases in total. The case where both are positive, the case where
both are zero, and the cases where only one is positive and not the other. All four cases
are observed in the data. Figure 1 documents that of the bilateral pairs in my sample,
80% contain at least one zero, with only roughly a fifth of all bilateral relationships
have both positive trade and FDI flows. Moreover, a quarter of the country pairs do
not trade with or do FDI with each other. This shows that despite the remarkable
growth in world trade and investment in the past half century, we still live in a world
that is nowhere near free trade or investment.
One might think that these zeros are simply a result of a group of countries not
trading or investing with one another. Figure 2 shows a scatterplot of the number of
8Figure 1.1: The Four Cases
21%
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2009
Distribution of Global Bilateral Relationships
trading partners on the number of FDI partners by reporting country. Clearly, countries
that do FDI with more countries also trade with more countries ceteris paribus. While
there are countries like China and Italy that receive FDI and imports from nearly
every country in the sample, there are also countries like New Zealand and Belgium
that receive imports from a much larger set of countries than it does FDI. There are
naturally countries like Nepal and Zimbabwe that only receive imports and inward FDI
from a small subset of countries. In sum, the figure shows that the prevalence of zeros
does not just come about because of a certain group of countries, but every country is
involved to some extent.
Thus far, the analysis has counted all zeros as equal in the sense that a zero between
two big countries is considered the same as a zero between two small countries. In the
tables that follow, I weigh the zeros by GDP and consider the sum of the GDPs of the
countries that do not trade or do MP with the average reporting country, relative to
total world GDP. Reporting countries can be big or small, where big countries have
GDP’s larger than the sample (world) average, which comes out to roughly 0.5% of
9Figure 1.2: Zeros in Trade vs. Zeros in MP
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total world GDP. In the entries highlighted in red, I show that the zeros are not simply
between small-small country pairs, but often involve at least one big country.
Table 1.1: GDP-Weighted Zeros in Trade
Reporter Type Big Zeros Small Zeros Total Nonzeros
Larger than Average 0.1 0.3 99
Smaller than Average 2.8 1.8 95
Table 1.2: GDP-Weighted Zeros in MP
Reporter Type Big Zeros Small Zeros Total Nonzeros
Larger than Average 18 4.6 77
Smaller than Average 52 6.3 42
10
Figure 1.3: Zeros by Destination Country (Trade)
Figure 1.4: Zeros by Destination Country (MP)
Figure 1.5: GDP-Weighted Zeros by Destination Country (Trade)
11
Figure 1.6: GDP-Weighted Zeros by Destination Country (MP)
Look at zeros across different destinations, one also finds significant heterogeneity.
For each destination country, Figures 3 and 4 plot the fraction of the sample that said
country does not import or receive investment from against GDP. These two figures
show that the zeros are not simply an artifact of a subset of countries, but apply to all
countries in the sample. For example, less than half the countries in the world invest
in the US, even though the US does trade with all the countries in my sample. The
number of zeros is negatively correlated with GDP, implying that small countries are
less likely recipients of trade and multinational production. Figures 5 and 6 also count
the number of zeros by destination by weigh these zeros by GDP. In comparing Figures
3 and 5, we see that while 70% of the world’s countries do not export to Tonga or
Samoa, these countries only make up about 15% of total world GDP. Figures 4 and 6
paint a different picture. Here, we see that even for countries like Sweden, Egypt or
New Zealand, weighing the zeros by GDP does not drastically alter the finding that big
countries do not produce there as the zeros for each of these destinations have GDP’s
that sum up to roughly half of the world’s total GDP. In conclusion, zeros are not just
between small countries, but often involve big countries as well.
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1.3 Model
The model is a monopolistic competition with homogeneous goods setup. There are
N countries, and two sets of firms producing differentiated products in each country:
a set of firms that produces domestically and exports, and another set that produces
domestically and does multinational production. The measure of firms that engage in
monopolistic competition is exogenous, and there exists a numeraire good sector as in
Chaney (2008). Country i produces wi units of the freely-traded numeraire good with
one unit of labor, and as is standard in this class of models, I only consider equilibria
where this good is produced in all countries, in effect pinning down the wage wi in
country i. Both trade and MP are subject to fixed entry and variable iceberg costs
that differ both across country pairs and between trade and MP. There is no free entry
condition; firms can choose not to enter countries where the fixed costs exceed expected
profits. Profits are aggregated into a global fund and distributed proportionally across
households. Goods can be produced or traded internationally, and are produced using
labor and capital which are mobile within but not across countries.
1.3.1 Consumers
There are i = 1, 2, . . . N countries and there is a measure Li of consumers in each country
i. Consumers maximize utility obtained from consuming goods in three sectors. Utility
from the first sector comes from consumption of the numeraire good. Each of the
other two sectors consists of consumption of differentiated goods: goods consumed in
one sector can be imported from another country, while the goods consumed in the
other sector can be produced by a foreign firm through multinational production. An
exogenous fraction 1− 2µ of income is spent on the numeraire good, leaving a fraction
µ to be spent on goods from each of the two differentiated sectors. Preferences are CES
over varieties of the differentiated goods with constant elasticity of substitution σ > 1.
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The problem for the representative consumer in country i can then be written as
max
c0i ,c
M
ij (ω),c
T
ij(ω)
(1− 2µ) log c0i + µ log cTi + µ log cMi
cTi =
(
N∑
j=1
∫
ΩTi
cTij(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
) σ
σ−1
cMi =
(
N∑
j=1
∫
ΩMi
cMij (ω)
σ−1
σ dω
) σ
σ−1
N∑
j=1
∫
ΩTi
pTij(ω)c
T
ij(ω)dω+
N∑
j=1
∫
ΩMi
pMij (ω)c
M
ij (ω)dω + p0c
0
i = wiLi + riKi + 2wiLipi
Denote the price indices for trade and MP by P Ti and P
M
i . These are given by
P Ti =
[ N∑
j=1
∫
ΩTi
pTij(ω)
1−σ
dω
] 1
1−σ
(1.1)
PMi =
[ N∑
j=1
∫
ΩMi
pMij (ω)
1−σ
dω
] 1
1−σ
(1.2)
Consumer optimization generates demand functions of the form (with capital-labor ratio
ki = Ki/Li and capital share α)
cMij (ω) = µ
pMij (ω)
−σ
PMi
1−σ Yi = µ
pMij (ω)
−σ
PMi
1−σ (wiLi + riKi + pii) = µ
pMij (ω)
−σ
PMi
1−σ wiLi
( 1
1− α + 2pi
)
(1.3)
cTij(ω) = µ
pTij(ω)
−σ
P Ti
1−σ Yi = µ
pTij(ω)
−σ
P Ti
1−σ (wiLi + riKi + pii) = µ
pMij (ω)
−σ
PMi
1−σ wiLi
( 1
1− α + 2pi
)
(1.4)
c0i = (1− 2µ)
Yi
p0
= (1− 2µ)
wiLi
(
1
1−α + 2pi
)
p0
(1.5)
These demand functions are taken as given by individual suppliers whose technology I
discuss next.
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1.3.2 Technology and Barriers to Trade and MP
Consider the two sectors with differentiated goods. All firms in country j operate a
technology with productivity φj . A firm in the trade sector in country j can access the
foreign market i by incurring fixed cost fTij ; similarly, a firm belonging to the MP sector
in country j can gain access to country i by incurring the fixed cost fMij . Exports from j
to i are subject to additional variable costs τTij that are of iceberg form. Similarly, there
are efficiency losses τMij associated with multinational production in i for firms from j.
Labor and capital are required to produce each differentiated good, with Cobb-Douglas
production function and capital share α. Firms in the MP sector from any country j
then solve N problems, one for each destination i, where they maximize profits given
by
piMij = max
pMij
{
pMij c
M
ij −
cMij
φj
τMij w
1−α
i r
α
i
(1− α)1−ααα − f
M
ij , 0
}
= max
pMij
{
pMij c
M
ij − cMij
τMij wi
φj
( 1
ki
)α( α
1− α
)α 1
(1− α)1−ααα − f
M
ij , 0
}
= max
pMij
{
pMij c
M
ij − cMij
τMij wi
φj
( 1
ki
)α 1
1− α − f
M
ij , 0
}
= max
pMij
{
µ
pMij
1−σ
PMi
1−σwiLi
( 1
1− α + 2pi
)
− p
M
ij
−σ
PMi
1−σwiLi
( 1
1− α + 2pi
)τMij wi
φj
( 1
ki
)α 1
1− α − f
M
ij , 0
}
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Similarly, firms in the trade sector from any country j then solve N problems, one for
each destination i, where they maximize profits given by
piTij = max
pTij
{
pTijc
T
ij −
cTij
φj
τTijw
1−α
j r
α
j
(1− α)1−ααα − f
T
ij , 0
}
= max
pTij
{
pTijc
T
ij − cTij
τTijwj
φj
( 1
kj
)α( α
1− α
)α 1
(1− α)1−ααα − f
T
ij , 0
}
= max
pTij
{
pTijc
T
ij − cTij
τTijwj
φj
( 1
kj
)α 1
1− α − f
T
ij , 0
}
= max
pTij
{
µ
pTij
1−σ
P Ti
1−σwiLi
( 1
1− α + 2pi
)
− p
T
ij
−σ
P Ti
1−σwiLi
( 1
1− α + 2pi
)τTijwj
φj
( 1
kj
)α 1
1− α − f
T
ij , 0
}
Optimality in such a monopolistic competition setup requires that firms charge the
Dixit-Stiglitz markup if it enters. On the other hand, if it does not enter, prices have
to tend to infinity to be consistent with zero demand. This yields pricing equations
pMij (φj) =
 τ
M
ij
wi
φj
σ
σ−1
(
1
ki
)α(
α
1−α
)α
if piMij > 0
∞ otherwise
(1.6)
pTij(φj) =
 τ
T
ij
wj
φj
σ
σ−1
(
1
kj
)α(
α
1−α
)α
if piTij > 0
∞ otherwise
(1.7)
These pricing rules imply that gross profits are proportional to expenditure, and hence
the equivalence relations
piTij > 0⇔ µ
1
σ
( pTij
P Ti
)1−σ
wiLi
( 1
1− α + 2pi
)
> fTij
piMij > 0⇔ µ
1
σ
( pMij
PMi
)1−σ
wiLi
( 1
1− α + 2pi
)
> fMij
Firms from j enter country i if profits net of fixed costs are positive. Denote entry by
a firm from j in the MP sector in country i by eMij and similarly entry into the trade
sector by eTij . Hence we have the optimal decision rules
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eMij (φj) =
 1 if µ
1
σ
( pMij
PMi
)1−σ
wiLi
(
1
1−α + 2pi
)
> fMij
0 otherwise
(1.8)
eTij(φj) =
 1 if µ
1
σ
( pTij
PTi
)1−σ
wiLi
(
1
1−α + 2pi
)
> fTij
0 otherwise
(1.9)
Note the difference between the wage terms that enter into these pricing relations: the
labor cost incurred by the foreign multinational is that of the destination country, while
the labor cost incurred by the exporter is that of the source country. This is the primary
conceptual difference between trade and FDI in this model.
1.3.3 Profits
As in Chaney, profits made be firms worldwide are pooled into a global mutual fund
and redistributed proportionally across households, with the representative household
in country i owning 2wiLi shares (as there is a measure θ
M
i = wiLi firms in country
i’s MP sector and similarly a measure θTi = wiLi in its trade sector). Hence profits or
dividends per share is given by
pi =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1
∑
s=M,T wjLj [µ
1
σ
( pSij
PSi
)1−σ
wiLi
(
1
1−α + 2pi
)
− fSij ]eSij
2
∑N
i=1wiLi
(1.10)
1.3.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of consumption plans c0i , c
T
ij for trade and c
M
ij for MP, pro-
duction plans y0i , y
T
ij for trade and y
M
ij for MP, labor allocations l
0
i , l
T
ij for trade and
lMij for MP, capital allocations k
T
ij for trade and k
M
ij for MP, entry decisions e
T
ij for
trade and eMij for MP, pricing decisions p
T
ij for trade and p
M
ij for MP, price indices P
T
i
for trade and PMi for MP and profits per share pi such that the following conditions hold:
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(i) Consumption plans are optimal, and solve the household problem, satisfying (3)-
(5).
(ii) Pricing decisions are optimal, and firm charge the Dixit-Stiglitz markup with entry,
and prices tend to infinity otherwise: (6)-(7).
(iii) Entry decisions are optimal, and firms only enter markets where profits exceed the
fixed entry costs: (8)-(9).
(iv) Production plans are optimal, where output, labor, and capital allocations satisfy
yTij = φje
T
ijk
T
ij
α
lTij
1α
(1.11)
yMij = φje
M
ij k
M
ij
α
lMij
1α
(1.12)
rik
T
ij
wilTij
=
rik
M
ij
wilMij
=
α
1− α (1.13)
y0i = Ail
0
i = wil
0
i (1.14)
(v) Price indices are consistent with the entry and pricing decisions of firms
PMi =
[ N∑
j=1
∫
ΩMi
pMij (ω)
1−σ
dω
] 1
1−σ
=
[ N∑
j=1
wjLjp
M
ij
1−σ
eMij
] 1
1−σ
(1.15)
P Ti =
[ N∑
j=1
∫
ΩTi
pTij(ω)
1−σ
dω
] 1
1−σ
=
[ N∑
j=1
wjLjp
T
ij
1−σ
eTij
] 1
1−σ
(1.16)
(vi) Profits or dividend per share are consistent with the entry and pricing decisions of
firms: (10).
(vii) All markets clear.
1.4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I operationalize the model and use it to illustrate the importance of
zeros for the gains from openness that arise from two specific policies: double taxation
18
treaties and regional trade agreements. First, I discuss the baseline calibration of the
model and show that it can match the main features of the data discussed earlier. Next, I
describe the policy experiments that I perform to gauge the importance of the aggregate
extensive margin. Subsequent to this, I describe the properties of the algorithm that I
use to compute the equilibrium following the policy reforms. I close this section with a
discussion of the main results.
1.4.1 Benchmark Calibration: With Extensive Margin
I categorize the list of parameters into three groups. The first group consists of parame-
ters common across all countries, as well as the list of coutnry-specific parameters. The
second group consists of the country pair-specific iceberg costs, both for trade and MP.
Finally, the third group consists of the country pair-specific fixed costs for both trade
and MP.
Country-Specific and Common Parameters
A country in the model is defined by a wage, a labor endowment, a capital endowment,
and a level of productivity that applies to all its firms. For wages, I extrapolate wage
data from the Occupational Wages around the World (OWW) Database constructed by
Freeman and Oostendorp (2012). Details for the construction of the wage series can be
found in the Appendix. For wages and the other exogenous country-specific parameters
given below, values for the US are normalized to 1. Labor endowments are taken from
the Penn World Tables (PWT). Capital stocks are constructed using investment and
GDP data from the PWT and the perpetual inventory method. Total factor productivity
as measured by the Solow residual is taken to be firm-level productivity. The elasticity
of substitution σ across differentiated goods in both trade and MP sectors is set to 4.
The expenditure share of each of the two differentiated sectors µ is set to 0.25. The
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capital share α is set to 0.33.
Country Pair-Specific Iceberg Costs
I consider three possibilities for the specification of the iceberg costs. First is the sym-
metric case, where the only variables that enter into the estimation of the iceberg costs
for trade and MP are distance, border, and language, as in the standard gravity for-
mulation. The second is the asymmetric specification with exporter fixed effects as in
Waugh (2008). He shows for trade that this is superior to the other two specifications
when he takes his model to the pricing data. The third specification is one with importer
fixed effects, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). The value add in what I am doing as
far as this is concerned is that I also consider these different specifications for MP, and
do it for a larger sample of countries using updated pricing data from the most recent
version of the International Comparison Program (ICP).
I find as does Waugh that the specification with exporter effects does best in account-
ing for the correlation between tradable prices and income in the data. In addition, the
specification wtih source effects does best in accounting for the correlation between MP
prices and income in the data. The variable costs τTij and τ
M
ij are then computed using
the coefficients obtained from the estimation with exporter and source country effects.
The gravity estimates are shown in the next table.
I regress positive trade or MP flows on the standard gravity variables of distance, lan-
guage and continguity as well as other control variables. The t-statistics are shown
below the regression coefficients. D1 to D6 are distance dummies that represent dif-
ferent intervals, with D1 being the shortest, and D6 the farthest. As expected, these
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dummies have negative coefficients, and are strongly statistically significant. Contin-
guity and common language also have the right signs, in that they are both positive,
meaning that sharing a common border and langauge does increase the volume of trade
or multinational production across countries. Finally I also present the estimates for
two policy variables: regional trade agreements and double taxation treaties. I find that
these variables are statistically significant even at the 1% level and have the right signs.
These coefficients can be transformed as in Waugh (2008), and I obtain trade iceberg
costs for the OECD that are very similar to Waugh’s estimates. The iceberg costs for
MP are roughly twice as high as those in trade on average, unsurprisingly higher as MP
shares are typically smaller than trade shares in the data.
Country Pair-Specific Fixed Costs
Denote the matrix of trade entry patterns in the data by ET and similarly the matrix
of empirical MP entry patterns by EM . Given an element eTij in E
T , eTij = 1 means
that country i imports from country j in the data and eTij = 0 means it does not. Given
the vector of wages, TFPs, labor endowments, and capital-to-labor ratios, the matrix
of iceberg costs and values for the common parameters (σ, α, µ), we can then construct
the prices that firms would charge if they entered each of the N locations according to
the Dixit-Stiglitz formula. This yields price matrices P T and PM . Given these price
and entry matrices, we can construct two matrices of price indices denoted by PT and
PM that would be the price indices firms faced in an equilibrium where entry patterns
were exactly as they were in the data. Given the price matrices (P T , PM ) and matrices
of price indices (PT,PM), we can then write the matrices for bilateral gross profits piT
and piM with representative elements piTij and pi
M
ij as functions of the global dividend
per share pi. piTij and pi
M
ij are the profits gross of fixed costs that country j firms in the
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Table 1.3: Gravity Estimates for Estimating Iceberg Costs to Trade and MP
MP Trade
d1 0.912**
(3.29)
d2 -0.338
(-0.93)
d3 -1.423*** -0.997***
(-4.23) (-5.47)
d4 -2.727*** -2.140***
(-7.89) (-12.13)
d5 -2.967*** -2.481***
(-8.81) (-14.24)
d6 -3.758*** -3.128***
(-10.79) (-17.74)
contig 0.389 0.590**
(1.26) (2.59)
comlang 0.749*** 0.198*
(4.71) (2.52)
dtt 1.436***
(11.91)
rta 1.036***
(13.12)
cons -7.923*** -4.885***
(-23.32) (-28.27)
trade and MP sector can make if it operates in country i. The final general equilibrium
object pi is then determined given all the aforementioned variables and the fixed cost
parameterization specified below.
I parameterize the fixed costs to be functions of the profit and entry matrices. In
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particular, for a given positive constant , I set
fTij = pi
T
ij + , if e
T
ij = 0
fTij = , if e
T
ij = 1
fMij = pi
M
ij + , if e
M
ij = 0
fMij = , if e
M
ij = 1
(1.17)
Given that the entry patterns are as they are in the data, the fixed costs are param-
eterized to guarantee entry where necessary and to suppress it otherwise. With this
parameterization of the fixed costs, we can write global dividend per share as a function
of  according to (10). Denote this by pi(), to make clear its dependence on the constant
. Then we know that bilateral profits that are functions of the dividend per share, can
also be written as functions of , i.e. piTij = pi
T
ij(pi) = pi
T
ij() and pi
M
ij = pi
M
ij (pi) = pi
M
ij ().
Then to have an equilibrium where piTij() ≥ fTij = , when eTij = 1 and piMij () ≥ fMij =
, when eMij = 1, the scalar  > 0 must satisfy the following restrictions:
 ≤ piTij ∀(i, j) ∈ ΩT (1.18)
 ≤ piMij ∀(i, j) ∈ ΩM (1.19)
where the sets ΩT and ΩM contain all the country pairs for which there is entry in trade
and MP in the data, i.e.
ΩT =
{
(i, j) : eTij = 1
}
ΩM =
{
(i, j) : eMij = 1
}
(1.20)
Define the functions gTij() = pi
T
ij()−  and gMij () = piMij ()− . It is not hard to show
that gTij() and g
M
ij () are strictly decreasing in , hence there exists ¯
T
ij > 0 that solves
gTij() = 0 and similarly ¯
M
ij > 0 that solves g
M
ij () = 0 for each (i, j) pair. Then for any
given pair (i, j) such that we need gTij() ≥ 0, we know that as long as ε ≤ ¯Tij , we will
have gTij(ε) ≥ 0. Hence, I set
 = λ ·min{{¯Tij : (i, j) ∈ ΩT} ∪ {¯Mij : (i, j) ∈ ΩM}} , λ ∈ (0, 1) (1.21)
23
Here we need to take the minimum of the ’s that satisfy the individual restrictions
because an  that satisfies one condition need not satisfy the other restrictions and the
scalar  must be set such that all the restrictions hold at the same time. With this value
of , I verify that in the benchmark equilibrium, profits and fixed costs are such that
the model generates entry patterns that match the entry patterns observed in the data
one for one.
The next figure shows the average fixed cost as a fraction of profits by destination
country for both trade and MP (where the scalar epsilon is the smallest possible). How
zeros affect welfare is through fixed costs, because the size of fixed costs is what de-
termines how much countries stand to gain from reform. When fixed costs are really
high, there are few zero-to-one transitions, and the effect of having this aggregate ex-
tensive margin is minimal. On the other hand, if fixed costs are relatively low, there
are more zero-to-one transitions, and the aggregate extensive margin is more important.
To understand the size of the fixed costs, I normalize these costs by profits, because
this is what matters to firms: how much of its profits have to go towards paying for the
initial fixed cost of establishing the trade or multinational relationship. What I present
here show are the average fixed costs in the parameterization that maximizes welfare
and hence minimizes fixed costs; as a result I obtain fixed costs that are an order of
magnitude smaller than those obtained in Alessandria and Choi (2012) who compute
fixed costs for US trade in a richer environment with dynamics. The x-axis plots the
average fixed cost for trade as a fraction of profit by destination, while the y-axis plots
the average fixed cost for multinational production as a fraction of total multinational
production profits. Three things can be taken away from this picture. First, the two
types of fixed costs are positively correlated: countries with high trade fixed costs tend
to have high MP fixed costs as well. This is not surprising as fixed costs are identified by
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zeros, and the trade and MP zeros by destination are also positively correlated. Second,
though they are positively correlated, the fixed costs for MP are generally higher than
the fixed costs for trade.This again relates back to the zeros: there are more MP zeros
than trade zeros. Finally, the average fixed cost as a fraction of profits for developing
countries are generally bigger than the average fixed costs for developed countries. This
reflects the fact that there are still more zeros in developing countries than there are in
developed countries.
Figure 1.7: Average Fixed Costs: Identified by Zero Trade and MP
One can go one step further and link the fixed costs obtained in this section with
the iceberg costs estimated earlier. To make the connection between iceberg costs and
fixed costs, note that they are linked through profits: to the extent that fixed costs have
to be higher than profits to suppress entry and profits are negatively correlated with
iceberg costs, for the zero pairs, fixed costs and iceberg costs are negatively correlated
as the next graph (estimates for Netherlands) shows.
1.4.2 Alternative Parameterization: No Extensive Margin
To make clear the role of the extensive margin, I consider an alternative parameteriza-
tion of my model where zero-to-one (aggregate entry) and one-to-zero (aggregate exit)
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Figure 1.8: Iceberg Variable Costs & Fixed Costs
transitions can never be observed following policy reform that lower the iceberg costs
to trade and MP. In order for this to be true, fixed costs have to be sufficiently close to
zero for country pairs where positive trade and MP are observed and sufficiently close
to infinity for country pairs where zero trade and MP are observed before the reform,
as the lemmata and the proposition below show.
Lemma 1. Given fsij = ∞. for all (i, j) such that esij = 0, s ∈ {T,M}, there is
no aggregate entry following policy reform.
Lemma 2. Given fsij = 0 for all (i, j) such that e
s
ij = 1, s ∈ {T,M}, then there
is no aggregate exit post-reform.
Lemma 3. If there is no aggregate entry and exit following policy reform, dividend per
share stays unchanged (pi′ = pi).
Lemmas 1 and 2 suggest that the following alternative parameterization is sufficient
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to prevent aggregate entry and exit:
fTij =∞, if eTij = 0
fTij = 0, if e
T
ij = 1
fMij =∞, if eMij = 0
fMij = 0, if e
M
ij = 1
(1.22)
This parameterization is not unique. If fixed costs are sufficiently high for pairs that do
not trade or do MP initially and sufficiently low for pairs that do, we also obtain the
result that zeros before the reform stay zero after the reform and likewise for those that
entered before the reform. The following proposition shows that because of Lemma 3,
the gains from openness obtained from all these other parameterizations with no aggre-
gate entry and exit coincide with that obtained in the limiting case just presented, so
we can compare our benchmark results against this limiting parameterization without
loss of generality.
Proposition 1. The welfare gains computed in the limiting parameterization given
by f sij = 0 for all (i, j) such that e
s
ij = 1, s ∈ {T,M} and fsij =∞ for all (i, j) such that
esij = 0, s ∈ {T,M} coincide with the welfare gains in an alternative parameterization
of fixed costs where fsij = f for all (i, j) such that e
s
ij = 1, s ∈ {T,M} and fsij = f¯ for
all (i, j) such that esij = 0, s ∈ {T,M} where f is sufficiently small and f¯ is sufficiently
large to ensure that there is no aggregate entry or exit post-reform.
1.4.3 Approximate Equilibrium
In what follows, I will consider policy reforms that lower the iceberg costs to trade and
MP for a large group of country pairs, holding all other parameters constant. In the
alternative parameterization with no room for aggregate entry or exit, computation of
the equilibrium is simple as by construction the post-reform entry patterns coincide
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with the pre-reform entry patterns - if there were positive trade or MP before, there
will be positive flows after the reform, and similarly for the pairs where there none.
In the baseline parameterization, however, this is not the case; pairs where there were
initially no flows need not remain zero as the fixed cost is not infinitely large, but rather
only epsilon larger than what profits would have been in the pre-reform equilibrium,
and lower iceberg costs increase profits ceteris paribus. Further, if there is aggregate
entry, there then can also be aggregate exit, as entry of low cost producers lowers the
prevailing price index and reduces demand for exising products. This means we need to
compute the entry decision for each firm and each potential destination, giving rise to
NxN (N = 107 countries) decisions in the traded sector and another NxN decisions in
the MP sector. For an exact equilibrium to exist, these 2xNxN decisions then need to
be consistent in the sense that the resulting price indices and dividend per share that re-
sults from such decisions are exactly the same set of price indices and dividend per share
that firms took as given when making their decisions. Only in certain special regions
in the parameter space do such exact equilibria exist. Appendix C presents an example
of the different regions in the parameter space in a simple two-country world with trade.
In the general case where an exact equilibrium does not exist, the standard approach of
iterating on the general equilibrium objects given by the price indices and the dividend
per share fails as cycles result and the algorithm does not converge. To get around this
problem, I develop an approximate equilibrium concept and an algorithm that com-
putes such approximate equilibria. In such an equilibrium, the entry decisions of agents
need not be perfectly consistent with the price indices and dividend per share that such
decisions engender. Positive equilibrium profits net of fixed costs do not automatically
imply entry and vice versa. The goal then is to compute an equilibrium that is approxi-
mately exact in the sense that false positives and false negatives are kept to a minimum.
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Below I formally define the approximate equilibrium concept.
Definition. (Approximate Equilibrium)
An approximate equilibrium that is x% accurate is an equilibrium wherein (1) coun-
tries engage in more than x% of all profitable bilateral relationships available to them,
and (2) of the bilateral relationships they engage in, more than x% yield positive profits.
Given that this study focuses on the effect of aggregate entry and exit on welfare,
the accuracy defined in the aforementioned equilibrium concept provides a measure of
how consistent aggregate entry and exit decisions are with profits net of fixed costs after
reform in the event that an exact equilibrium (equivalently, an approximate equilibrium
that is 100% accurate) fails to exist. Rather than iterating in the space of general equi-
librium objects, I iterate in decision-rule space. And as I iterate in the space of decision
rules, it is important that firms have accurate expectations over the decision rules for
the other firms in the world economy. This perception depends on the specification of
decision rules that firms take as given; this specification needs to be structured in a
way that reflects how different firms behave when faced with the same policy change.
Given the parameterization of the fixed costs, the proposition below shows that it is the
low cost firms that enter and the high cost firms that exit following policy reform, after
controlling for country-pair type. A type is a set of country pairs that are impacted the
same way by general equilibrium forces; there are 4N for trade and 4N for MP, where
N is the number of countries. Given this type-specific monotonicity in entry and exit
following reform, I specify cutoff rules for the entry decisions and find that the approx-
imate equilibrium computed is accurate 99% of the time. A more detailed description
of the algorithm can be found in Appendix B.
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Proposition 2. (Type-Specific Cutoffs)
(i) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τT
′
ij = τ
T
ij
and eTij = 0, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i do not enter destination
j pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them are not affected by the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi1 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
cTij ≥ xi1, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eT
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cTik < xi1 choose to enter after the reform (e
T ′
ik = 1).
(ii) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τT
′
ij = τ
T
ij
and eTij = 1, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i enter destination j
pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them are not affected by the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi2 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
cTij ≥ xi2, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eT
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cTik < xi2 choose to enter after the reform (e
T ′
ik = 1).
(iii) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τT
′
ij < τ
T
ij
and eTij = 1, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i enter destination j
pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them fall as a result of the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi3 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
cTij ≥ xi3, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eT
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cTik < xi3 choose to enter after the reform (e
T ′
ik = 1).
(iv) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τT
′
ij < τ
T
ij
and eTij = 0, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i do not enter destination
j pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them fall as a result of the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi4 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
cTij ≥ xi4, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eT
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cTik < xi4 choose to enter after the reform (e
T ′
ik = 1).
(v) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τM
′
ij = τ
M
ij
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and eMij = 0, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i do not enter destination
j pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them are not affected by the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi5 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
cMij ≥ xi5, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eM
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cMik < xi5 choose to enter after the reform (e
M ′
ik = 1).
(vi) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τM
′
ij = τ
M
ij
and eMij = 1, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i enter destination j
pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them are not affected by the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi6 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
cMij ≥ xi6, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eM
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cMik < xi6 choose to enter after the reform (e
M ′
ik = 1).
(vii) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τM
′
ij < τ
M
ij
and eMij = 1, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i enter destination j
pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them fall as a result of the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi7 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
cMij ≥ xi7, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eM
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cMik < xi7 choose to enter after the reform (e
M ′
ik = 1).
(viii) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τM
′
ij < τ
M
ij
and eMij = 0, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i do not enter destination
j pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them fall as a result of the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi8 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
cMij ≥ xi8, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eM
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cMik < xi8 choose to enter after the reform (e
M ′
ik = 1).
Corollary 1. (Type-Specific Monotonicity)
(i) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from two countries j and k such that
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τT
′
ij = τ
T
ij , τ
T ′
ik = τ
T
ik, e
T
ij = 0, and e
T
ik = 0. If c
T
ik < c
T
ij , then e
T ′
ik ≥ eT
′
ij .
(ii) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from two countries j and k such that
τT
′
ij = τ
T
ij , τ
T ′
ik = τ
T
ik, e
T
ij = 1, and e
T
ik = 1. If c
T
ik < c
T
ij , then e
T ′
ik ≥ eT
′
ij .
(iii) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from two countries j and k such that
τT
′
ij < τ
T
ij , τ
T ′
ik < τ
T
ik, e
T
ij = 1, and e
T
ik = 1. If c
T
ik < c
T
ij , then e
T ′
ik ≥ eT
′
ij .
(iv) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from two countries j and k such that
τT
′
ij < τ
T
ij , τ
T ′
ik < τ
T
ik, e
T
ij = 0, and e
T
ik = 0. If c
T
ik < c
T
ij , then e
T ′
ik ≥ eT
′
ij .
(v) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from two countries j and k such that
τM
′
ij = τ
M
ij , τ
M ′
ik = τ
M
ik , e
M
ij = 0, and e
M
ik = 0. If c
M
ik < c
M
ij , then e
M ′
ik ≥ eM
′
ij .
(vi) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from two countries j and k such that
τM
′
ij = τ
M
ij , τ
M ′
ik = τ
M
ik , e
M
ij = 1, and e
M
ik = 1. If c
M
ik < c
M
ij , then e
M ′
ik ≥ eM
′
ij .
(vii) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from two countries j and k such that
τM
′
ij < τ
M
ij , τ
M ′
ik < τ
M
ik , e
M
ij = 1, and e
M
ik = 1. If c
M
ik < c
M
ij , then e
M ′
ik ≥ eM
′
ij .
(viii) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from two countries j and k such that
τM
′
ij < τ
M
ij , τ
M ′
ik < τ
M
ik , e
M
ij = 0, and e
M
ik = 0. If c
M
ik < c
M
ij , then e
M ′
ik ≥ eM
′
ij .
1.4.4 Policy Experiments
I consider the effect of two policy reforms: the formation of regional trade agreements as
well as the signing of double taxation treaties globally. Of the 11449 bilateral country
pairs in my sample, roughly 20% have double taxation treaties, and similarly, about
20% have regional trade agreements, though the subsamples that have these policies
in place do not completely coincide. From my gravity estimation, I find that having a
regional trade agreement lowers iceberg trade costs by 32%. By the same token, I find
that having a double taxation treaty lowers iceberg MP costs by 38%.
I consider the gains from openness that result from a combination of trade and financial
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liberalization. For trade liberalization, I consider the formation of regional trade agree-
ments worldwide: country pairs that are initially not part of a regional trade agreement
form a regional trade agreement after the reform. For financial liberalization, I consider
the establishment of double taxation treaties: country pairs with no double taxation
treaties sign double taxation treaties after reform. I then ask the following questions.
What do countries stand to gain from such policies? Are the gains symmetric across
countries? Do these gains come primarily through trade or MP? And finally, how do
the gains from the model with an extensive margin that allows aggregate entry and exit
differ from the gains obtained from the model with no extensive margin?
Trade vs. MP
The total gains from openness are given by
W ′i
Wi
= log
(
1
1−α + 2pi
′
)
PMi
µ
P Ti
µ(
1
1−α + 2pi
)
PM
′
i
µ
P T
′
i
µ
These gains can come through greater consumption of the varieties in the traded goods
sector, the MP sector or the numeraire good sector. The change in welfare due to trade
is given by
W T
′
i
W Ti
= log
(
1
1−α + 2pi
′
)µ
P Ti
µ(
1
1−α + 2pi
)µ
P T
′
i
µ
Similarly, the change in welfare due to MP is given by
WM
′
i
WMi
= log
(
1
1−α + 2pi
′
)µ
PMi
µ(
1
1−α + 2pi
)µ
PM
′
i
µ
Table 3 shows the total gains to trade and financial liberalization decomposed into the
trade and MP channels. The countries are ranked in terms of income, and the gains
are averaged across the countries belonging to each quartile. Countries in the bottom
quartile, for example, gain 6.1% in real income terms on average, with more than half
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these gains coming through MP 3.2%, and about a third coming through trade 2.3%.
In the baseline parameterization, reforms are welfare-improving on average, but do not
affect all countries equally, with more gains accruing to low-income countries. This is
not surprising as poor countries gain more from consuming new goods obtained from
rich countries than rich countries do from consuming new goods obtained from poor
countries. Further, notice the asymmetry in the decomposition of the gains into the
trade and MP channels across the different income groups. With the exception of the
top quartile where trade generates greater welfare gains than MP, the MP channel dom-
inates. This is unsurprising given that there are more MP zeros than trade zeros in the
data, and a lot of these zeros involve rich, highly productive countries (as documented
in Section 2). I turn to the role of the extensive margin next.
Table 1.4: Percentage Gain in Real GDP After Reform: Trade vs MP
Percentiles Overall Gains Trade Gains MP Gains
00-25 6.1 2.3 3.2
26-50 6.2 2.4 3.3
51-75 5.1 2.3 2.3
76-100 3.3 2.2 0.7
Total 5.2 2.3 2.4
Benchmark vs. Model with No Extensive Margin
In the parameterization section, I discuss two versions of the model: one with a role for
the aggregate extensive margin, and one without. Table 4 shows the results of running
the same reforms on these two different environments. The model with aggregate entry
and exit estimates greater gains from openness than the model with no zero-to-one
transitions on average: 5.2% vs. 4.0% following trade and financial liberalization. This
comparison between averages does not apply across the board. The underestimation
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of the welfare gains from trade and financial liberalization is more significant for the
bottom quartiles: whereas countries in the top quartile gain roughly 3% (3.3% or 2.6%)
in both environments (with or without zero-to-one transitions), countries in the bottom
quartile gain only 4.7% instead of 6.1% when one does not allow for aggregate entry and
exit. Apart from overestimating the gains, there is another distinction between the two
versions: reforms that lower iceberg costs worldwide unambiguously result in welfare
gains in the model with no extensive margin, in contrast to the possible losses following
reform in the benchmark model. In the model with no extensive margin, no additional
fixed costs are incurred following reform as there is no aggregate entry or exit, and
income rises and price indices fall, so welfare has to rise. By contrast, the benchmark
model allows for aggregate entry and exit, with potentially higher price indices and
lower income given the resources lost in paying for the additional fixed costs. To the
extent that previously consumed goods are highly valued, and the fixed costs incurred in
the formation of new bilateral relationships are substantial, reforms can result in lower
welfare. This does not occur in this particular experiment, but does occur in other
experiments (available upon request) where the model with no extensive margin not
only overestimates the gains following reform, it predicts positive gains when entry and
exit would imply losses. For both its effects on the absolute vaue of the gains as well as
its sign, the aggregate extensive margin is quantitatively important for measuring the
gains from openness.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I document the prevalence of zeros in trade and multinational production
in the data and study the effect of incorporating the extensive margin that arises from
these zeros on the gains from openness. I find that relative to models where zeros matter,
models with no aggregate entry or exit underestimates the gains from openness by 30%
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Table 1.5: Percentage Gain in Real GDP After Reform: The Role of Zeros
Percentiles Pure Intensive Margin Model Benchmark Model
00-25 4.7 6.1
26-50 4.8 6.2
51-75 3.9 5.1
76-100 2.6 3.3
Total 4.0 5.2
on average, with the discrepancy larger for countries in the developing world. There
has been growing interest in zeros at the firm- and goods-level; it would be interesting
to see how the welfare impact of zeros at these different levels of aggregation differ
and how these differences can be reconciled within a unifying framework. By the same
token, there has been research that focuses on more complex interactions between trade
and multinational production (e.g. intra-firm imports, export-platform multinational
production), albeit focusing on firms from a particular country or a smaller group of
countries where zeros do not occur. It would be instructive to see what gains result in
the context of a model that has both aggregate zero-to-one transitions and direct (not
general equilibrium or policy-generated) interactions between trade and multinational
production. I leave both these extensions for future research.
Chapter 2
International Trade and the Rise
of the Service Economy
2.1 Introduction
Why does labor move into the service sector as countries get richer? The two main
explanations that have been propounded thus far are an income elasticity for services
that is greater than one (e.g. Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie 2001), or aggregate sectoral
goods that are complementary (elasticity of substitution less than one) coupled with
an exogenously slow-growing service sector (e.g. Ngai and Pissarides 2008). While the
former may be intuitively appealing, it is the latter which has been borne out in the
data (Duarte and Restuccia, 2008). In this paper, I propose a new mechanism (asym-
metrically lower trade barriers) by which labor moves into the service sector and the
service sector productivity endogenously grows less over time compared to the rest of
the economy.
To help motivate the theory, I document three empirical facts regarding the service
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sector. First, I show that services are skill-intensive relative to the rest of the economy.
This ties in nicely with the second observation that countries who were skill-abundant
fifty years ago continue to be skill-abundant today. The two observations go hand in
hand because these skill-abundant countries are the most highly developed countries
for which services comprise a bigger portion of total value added. The third piece of
evidence that I present relates to the tradability of services: relative to their share of
aggregate value added or labor, services make up a much smaller portion of total trade.
This suggests that the barriers to service trade are much greater than the barriers to
merchandise trade.
How, then, can one make sense of the growing share of services in overall output and
labor in light of these three observations? I see the growth in the labor share of services
as the result of the opening to trade of the world’s most skill-abundant countries. In
the Heckscher-Ohlin model with heterogeneous firms that I construct, as trade barri-
ers fall, the return to skilled labor in skill-abundant countries rise and this generates
the movement of workers into the skill-intensive sector (services) of the skill-abundant
country (the developed world). With the Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) setup that I use to
deal with firm-level idiosyncratic productivity, my model also yields predictions that
are consistent with firm-level evidence on trade in services presented in Breinlich and
Criscuolo (2011): there is selection into exporting markets, and exporters hire more
workers, sell more, and are more productive. These features of the data also imply
that to model trade in services, firm-level heterogeneity is a must. Further, since the
evidence indicates that the trade barriers to services remain high relative to those in the
rest of the economy, productivity in that sector will be lower, consistent with Duarte
and Restuccia (2008), where they show that low productivity in services account for
most of the recent productivity slowdown in the developed world.
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It is clear that this paper is closely linked to the literature on structural change, and
in this literature, I take my contribution to be establishing the link between trade and
the service economy. While there have been papers documenting the rise of the service
economy (see Buera and Kaboski, 2011 and the references therein), thus far there has
been none documenting how this rise coincides with the opening to trade of countries
in which this rise has been observed (countries have to be in the advanced stages of
structural transformation for services to be definitively rising over time; manufactur-
ing could be growing instead for countries only beginning the transformation process).
On trade and structural change, most research has been directed at accounting for the
hump-shaped pattern of labor in manufacturing. Yi and Zhang (2011), for instance,
demonstrate that in a multi-sector, Eaton-Kortum world a hump shape is possible even
when the growth rate in manufacturing is the highest. Matsuyama (2009) also uses a
Ricardian framework to show that high productivity growth in manufacturing need not
translate to a falling manufacturing employment share. Coleman (2007), on the other
hand, employs a multi-country Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardo framework to analyze the ef-
fects of large emerging countries on world welfare. The first two papers have little to
say about differences in factor abundance and intensities across sectors and how these
can translate to wage differentials across sectors and slower productivity growth. The
last paper has services as a non-traded sector and does not feature firm-level hetero-
geneity; it is thus unable to account for lower productivity growth in services that is a
key feature of the data.
In terms of the modeling environment, there has been a recent resurgence of interest
in Heckscher-Ohlin models, in particular those pertaining to trade and growth. Bajona
and Kehoe (2006, 2010) and Caliendo (2011) have recently studied the dynamics of
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Heckscher-Ohlin models and showed that patterns of specialization in such models are
hard to characterize but have rich implications for both prices and quantities that help
to bridge the gap between Heckscher-Ohlin models and data. While these models are a
step forward from the static analysis of endowment-driven comparative advantage, they
are not able to account for intra-industry trade. In contrast, models that incorporate
heterogeneity in firm-level productivity produce intra-industry trade, and for certain
parameterizations can deliver sharper predictions of industry-level trade that are con-
sistent with the data. Eaton and Kortum (2002, 2005), Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008)
are prominent examples of such models, where the extensive margin is shown to be par-
ticularly important. Closer to this paper, Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) study
a two-sector static model that have both the aforementioned features: inter-industry
trade as driven by differences in factor endowments across countries, and intra-industry
trade as driven by differences in firm-level productivity. However, these authors do not
present any evidence that suggests what the sectors in their model represent and embed
the Melitz (2003) model (as opposed to Melitz-Ottaviano in my setup) in the standard
Heckscher-Ohlin framework. This is important because the mechanism through which
average sector-level productivity rises is fundamentally different in these two environ-
ments: in Melitz (2003), increased factor market competition (exporters demanding
more workers driving up wages) forces out the least productive firms, in contrast to
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), where labor supply is perfectly elastic to differentiated
firms while import competition shifts up the price elasticity of demand for all firms,
causing the least productive ones to drop out. The basic Melitz (2003) framework also
fails to produce endogenously different markups across firms, which is a key feature of
both Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and the data. Finally, my research is also related to
the literature on the effects of globalization on the macroeconomy, where the closest pa-
per is Burstein and Vogel (2011). Embedding Eaton-Kortum (2002) into a multi-sector
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Heckscher-Ohlin model, they show that globalization is important in quantitatively ac-
counting for the rise of the skill premium. Here I am more interested in the effects of
globalization on the service sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical evidence relevant to
the mechanism. The baseline model is described in section 3, which also contains all the
main propositions. I extend the model to allow for intermediate goods and capital in
Section 4 and show that the main results continue to hold. The last section concludes.
All tables and graphs can be found in the Appendix.
2.2 Motivating Evidence
I present three pieces of empirical evidence. The first relates to the relative stability
of skill abundance over time. My preferred measure of skill abundance is the fraction
of the population aged 15 and older with completed higher education, and I find that
countries that have more college graduates 50 years ago continue to have more highly
educated workers on average. Further, this positive correlation is robust across decades
and is presented in Table 1. Figure 1 shows this positive relationship in its weakest
form between 1960 and 2010. Even then the correlation coefficient is 0.77. The source
of the data is the Cohen and Soto Education Database (2007).
The second piece of evidence relates to the tradability of services. While more than
half of the labor force in most developed countries are now employed in the services,
service trade still makes up a much smaller fraction of overall trade. Figure 3 shows the
evolution of labor shares in the service sector for the OECD and GGDC countries in the
last thirty years. This monotonic increase is well documented in the structural change
literature and goes back to the 1960s. Trade data for services are obtained as a residual
between total trade data obtained from World Bank and goods trade data obtained
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from UN Comtrade. This disparity between the labor and trade share of services is
displayed in Figure 2. Note that all 30 countries for which we have data lie below the
45 degree line. I interpret this to mean the barriers to trade in services are significantly
higher than barriers to trade in non-services.
The last piece of evidence concerns the skill intensity of the service sector relative to
non-services. Given that my measure of skill in this paper is completed higher education,
I use data from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) to see whether there are
better-educated workers in the service sector relative to the rest of the economy. Table
2 shows that for both average years of education and percentage that complete higher
education, service workers score systematically higher than those in non-services in the
last 40 years. I take this to be evidence that services are more skill-intensive than
the rest of the economy. Snapshots in time of skill intensity of the various subsectors
that make up services and non-services are provided in Tables 3 and 4. While there
is significant heterogeneity across subsectors within these broader categories, it is clear
that service workers on average are better-educated than the workers in the rest of the
economy. The (standard) sector classification used is presented in Table 5.
To summarize, I make the following observations regarding the data.
Observation 2.1. The relative levels of skill abundance across countries have been
stable over time.
Observation 2.2. Barriers to trade in services are higher than in the rest of the econ-
omy.
Observation 2.3. In the United States, services are skill-intensive relative to non-
services.
There are two other aggregate-level observations that I will try to address using this
framework, the first of which concerns the skill premium and the second, sector-level
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productivity in the services. It is well-known that the skill premium as measured by
relative wages of college graduates to the rest of the workforce has been rising over time.
Moreover, productivity growth in services is lower on average than that of the rest of
the economy (Duarte and Restuccia, 2010).
The observations I have highlighted relate to the service sector as a whole. They are
instructive for the two main points that I want to make, i.e. movement of labor into
services in the developed world and lower productivity in the services. They paint
an incomplete picture, however, given that there is significant (firm-level) heterogeneity
within both the service and non-service sectors. Much work has been done documenting
the properties of firms that engage in goods trade (the latter): see Bernard and Jensen
(1995, 1999), Bernard et al. (2007), Wagner (2007), and Greenaway and Kneller (2007).
There has been, however, little research documenting the activities of firms involved in
service trade, with the exception of the recent contribution by Breinlich and Criscuolo
(2011). Using two firm-level datasets on service exports and imports in the UK from
2000 to 2005, these authors show that service exporters are similar to goods exporters
in many ways: exporters sell more, hire more workers, and are more productive than
non-exporters; also, relatively few firms export and within exporters, only a few firms
export many products to many destinations. Given the similarities between service and
goods exporters, and the fact that one of the foundations (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008)
on which I build my model can account well for the trends observed in goods exporters,
my model will generate implications consistent with the data along this dimension as
well.
43
2.3 Model
The basic setup is a combination of Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) and Heckscher-Ohlin.
There are two sectors, one more skill-intensive than the other. There are two fac-
tors, skilled and unskilled labor. Both types of labor are specialized in the sense that
skilled workers cannot do things that unskilled workers can do, while unskilled labor
also cannot be used to substitute for skilled labor. Consider first two countries, one
skilled-labor abundant the other unskilled-labor abundant. Within each sector, there
is a continuum of differentiated goods which is subject to costly trade, and an outside
good that is always produced (thus restricting the parameter space) and freely traded
across countries. Factor price equalization is assumed throughout (yet another con-
straint on the parameter space). Technology is linear, and initially I consider a variant
of the model where factors are sector-specific, i.e. the skill-intensive sector uses only
skilled labor while the other sector uses only unskilled labor. This setup is reminiscent
of Ventura (1997), and it eases the exposition considerably. The main results still go
through in more general setups, including those with intermediate and capital goods, as
I show later. For now, this assumption guarantees that with the skilled wage normalized
to one, the price of the freely traded outside good in the skilled sector is one, while that
in the unskilled sector is simply the unskilled wage wU .
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2.3.1 Autarky
Households in each country solve the following problem
max a log(qcs,0 + α
∫
qcs(i)di−
1
2
γ
∫
[qcs(i)]
2di− 1
2
η[
∫
qcs(i)di]
2)
+ (1− a) log(qcu,0 + α
∫
qcu(i)di−
1
2
γ
∫
[qcu(i)]
2di− 1
2
η[
∫
qcu(i)di]
2)
s.t. qcs,0 +
∫
ps(i)q
c
s(i)di+ wUq
c
u,0 +
∫
pl(i)q
c
u(i)di ≤M
Here a is the income share of the skill-intensive sector, qcs,0 is an individual consumer’s
demand for the outside good in the skill-intensive sector, and qcu,0 is the corresponding
demand for the outside good in the other sector. Individual demand for differentiated
goods (varieties) in sector j is denoted by qcj(i). We denote income by M . Utility over
the differentiated goods in each sector is defined as in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008): α and
η control the demand for the differentiated goods relative to the outside good while γ
controls the amount of disutility an individual gets from variation in his consumption
of the different varieties.
The solution to the problem above are demand functions of the form
qcs(i) =
1
γ
[α− ps(i)− ηNs(α− p¯s)
γ + ηNs
]
qcu(i) =
1
γ
[α− ps(i)
wU
− ηNu(α−
p¯u
wU
)
γ + ηNu
]
where pj(i) denotes that price for the differentiated variety i in sector j, Nj is the
number of monopolistically competitive sellers (firms) in sector j, and p¯j =
∫
pj(i)di
is the average price of a variety in sector j. Note that demand for individual varieties
within sector can be zero, as marginal utilities for all goods are bounded. In particular,
when the price of a variety in sector i exceeds pi,max, demand for that variety goes to
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zero. From the demand functions we get that pi,max is
cSD = ps,max =
γα
γ + ηNs
+
ηNs
γ + ηNs
p¯s
cUD = pu,max =
γα
γ + ηNu
+
ηNu
γ + ηNu
p¯u
wU
Given these cutoff points, I can write the (aggregate) demand equations for a country
with population (total workforce) L as
qs(i) = q
c
s(i) =
L
γ
[cSD − ps(i)], qU (i) = qcu(i) =
L
γ
[cUD − pu(i)
wU
]
The price of the differentiated good is obtained by solving the firm’s problem. Firms
draw idiosyncratic unit cost (inverse productivity) c from a distribution with cdf G(c)
and operate linear technology, hence solving the problem given by
max ps(c)qs(c)− cqs(c) ⇒ qs(c)− L
γ
ps(c)− cL
γ
= 0
max pu(c)qU (c)− wUcqU (c) ⇒ qU (c)− L
γ
pu(c)
wU
− cL
γ
= 0
Taking demand functions and factor prices as given, firms maximizing profits set the
optimal pricing rule
ps(c) =
1
2
(cSD + c), pu(c) =
1
2
(cUD + c)wU
Given these pricing functions, the maximum price obtained earlier also pins down the
cutoff productivity below which firms that produce will encounter zero demand. The
inverse of these cutoff levels of productivity are denoted cUD and cSD, consistent with
notation in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008). As will be seen shortly, this serves as a sufficient
statistic for describing other measures of firm performance at the aggregate level that
are often reported in the data: markup, output, sales, and profits. For a firm with
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inverse productivity c, the (sector-specific) performance measures are given by
Markup
µs(c) =
1
2
(cSD − c), µU (c) = 1
2
(cUD − c)wU
Output
qs(c) =
L
2γ
(cSD − c), qU (c) = L
2γ
(cUD − c)
Sales
rs(c) =
L
4γ
(c2SD − c2), rU (c) =
L
4γ
(c2UD − c2)wU
Profits
pis(c) =
L
4γ
(cSD − c)2, piU (c) = L
4γ
(cUD − c)2wU
Firms with lower unit costs (higher productivity) charge lower prices, but do not com-
pletely bear the cost differential in that they charge higher markups as well. Their lower
prices enable these firms to make higher profits from increased sales.
It is worth noting that in this environment, as in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008), markups
vary across firms, with higher productivity firms charging higher markups as we see in
the data. This is in contrast to Melitz (2003) or models with monopolistic competition
but homogeneous goods (e.g. Krugman 1980 or Helpman and Krugman 1987), where
the markup is tied to the elasticitiy of substitution across goods. Note that given our
assumptions on preferences and technologies, differences across sectors are only mani-
fested in the wage term that enters nominal variables like profits, markups and sales.
In particular, output for two firms that belong to different sectors but have the same
productivity will be the same in this economy.
To get analytical expressions for these variables and the cutoff level of productivity,
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assume that firm-level productivity draws follow a Pareto distribution with lower pro-
ductivity bound 1cM and shape parameter k ≥ 1, i.e. G(c) = ( ccM )k, c ∈ [0, cM ]. Then
the free entry condition yields the cutoff level for each sector
∫
pis(c)dG(c) = fe,s ⇒ cSD =
[
2γfe,sc
K
m(k + 1)(k + 2)
L
] 1
k+2
∫
piU (c)dG(c) = wUfe,U ⇒ cUD =
[
2γfe,Uc
K
m(k + 1)(k + 2)
L
] 1
k+2
Given these cutoff values and the assumptions on the productivity distribution, I can
write the performance measures for the average firm, which I do only for the skilled-
labor sector for the sake of brevity (expressions for the other sector are analogous).
With the average level for any variable xj given by x¯j =
∫ cjD
0 xj(c)dc
G(cjD)
we have
c¯S =
k
k + 1
cSD, q¯S =
L
2γ
1
k + 1
cSD =
(k + 2)(cM )
k
(cSD)k+1
fe,s
p¯S =
2k + 1
2k + 2
cSD, r¯S =
L
2γ
1
k + 2
(cSD)
2 =
(k + 1)(cM )
k
(cSD)k
fe,s
µ¯S =
1
2
1
k + 1
cSD, p¯iS = fe,s
(cM )
k
(cSD)k
The cutoff ciD completely summarizes the distribution of prices as well as other perfor-
mance measures. One other variable critical in developing intuition for the mechanism
behind this model is competition. Competition in this world is the number of firms Ni
competing in sector i, where Ni is given by
Ns =
2γ
η
α− cSD
cSD − c¯S , Nu =
2γ
η
α− cUD
cUD − c¯U
Welfare, as measured by indirect utility V , is then
V = a log(S +
α− cSD
2η
[α− k + 1
k + 2
cSD]) + (1− a) log(wUU + α− cUD
2η
[α− k + 1
k + 2
cUD])
48
Where the relative wage is determined by income shares and factor endowments
wUU
S
=
1− a
a
⇒ wU = 1− a
a
S
U
Clearly, welfare increases with decreases in the cutoffs cSD and cUD, as these induce
increases in product variety NS and NU and decreases in the average price pS and pU
in each sector.
2.3.2 Free Trade
Free trade in this environment with factor price equalization allows me to characterize
equilibrium using the integrated equilibrium approach as in Dixit and Norman (1980).
This implies the equilibrium relationships obtained above continue to hold, albeit for
the world economy as a whole. I begin with a statement about factor returns.
Claim 2.4. The return to the skilled labor relative to unskilled labor is lower in the
skill-abundant country and rises in the movement from autarky to free trade.
Proof. Since
U1
S1
<
U1 + U2
S1 + S2
<
U2
S2
hence
a
1− a
U1
S1
<
a
1− a
U1 + U2
S1 + S2
<
a
1− a
U2
S2
⇔ 1
w1,AU
<
1
wFTU
<
1
w2,AU
As in Heckscher Ohlin, the autarky return to the abundant factor is lower and the
opening of both countries to free trade raises the return to these factors when factor
price equalization holds. In the world considered above, there is no intersectoral labor
reallocation following the opening to trade because factors are sector-specific. But in
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a more realistic setting where both factors are needed in the production of goods in
either sector, the change in factor returns will induce movements across and within
sectors. Within sector movements in this case reflect the change in the cutoff value:
the greater competition brought out by the opening of trade lowers the cutoff inverse
productivity level at which firms can sell positive amounts of their goods and induces
labor reallocation from low productivity to high productivity firms within each sector.
The proof for the change in cutoff levels is straightforward as demonstrated in the claim
below.
Claim 2.5. The cutoff levels cSD and cUD for inverse productivity in each country falls
from autarky to free trade.
Proof. Given that
cSD =
[
2γfe,sc
K
m(k + 1)(k + 2)
L
] 1
k+2
, cUD =
[
2γfe,Uc
K
m(k + 1)(k + 2)
L
] 1
k+2
Under autarky,
LA = Li = Si + U i
With free trade
LFT =
2∑
i=1
Li =
2∑
i=1
Si + U i
Hence for any sector i in country j, where i ∈ {S,U}, j ∈ {1, 2}, we have
cFTiD = c
j,FT
iD < c
j,A
iD
Note that this contrasts with the result obtained in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007)
where sectoral cutoffs are unchanged when moving from free trade to autarky. Here the
intuition is that with free trade, domestic producers face greater competition resulting
in the exit of lower productivity firms in both sectors. The next claim shows clearly the
effects of trade on competition.
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Claim 2.6. Competition in both sectors is higher (i.e. there are more firms in equilib-
rium) in free trade than in autarky for both countries.
Proof. By the claim above, ∀i ∈ S,U and j ∈ 1, 2
cFTiD = c
j,FT
iD < c
j,A
iD
Now note that
Ns =
2γ
η
α− cSD
cSD − c¯S , Nu =
2γ
η
α− cUD
cUD − c¯U
Since Ni is decreasing in ciD for i = S,U , we must have ∀i ∈ S,U and j ∈ 1, 2
NFTiD = N
j,FT
iD > N
j,A
iD
Building on this result, I can complete the basic intuition by discussing the effect greater
competition has on the firm-level performance measures. Higher competition forces the
average firm to charge a lower markup but greater demand in turn enables them to sell
more, get higher revenue and earn greater profits. Hitherto what I’ve discussed is not
fundamentally different than the mechanism in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008). The twist in
our setup lies in the fact that the statements on sales, revenue and profit above are now
only true for the comparative advantage sector in the skill-abundant country (conversely
for the other country); in the comparative disadvantage sector, the return to the factor
used intensively falls following the move to free trade so that the aforementioned nominal
variables for the average firm no longer respond monotonically to the change in cutoffs
as discussed. This is summarized in the next claim.
Claim 2.7. Average firm-level productivity and output is higher and markup lower in
both sectors in free trade than in autarky. In the skill-abundant country, the sales
(revenue) and profit of the average firm are higher in the comparative advantage sector
under free trade.
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Proof. From above
c¯S =
k
k + 1
cSD, q¯S =
L
2γ
1
k + 1
cSD =
(k + 2)(cM )
k
(cSD)k+1
fe,s
p¯S =
2k + 1
2k + 2
cSD, r¯S =
L
2γ
1
k + 2
(cSD)
2 =
(k + 1)(cM )
k
(cSD)k
fe,s
µ¯S =
1
2
1
k + 1
cSD, p¯iS = fe,s
(cM )
k
(cSD)k
To complete the argument, I write out the equivalent expressions for the unskilled-labor
intensive sector:
c¯U =
k
k + 1
cUD, q¯U =
L
2γ
1
k + 1
cUD =
(k + 2)(cM )
k
(cUD)k+1
fe,u
p¯U =
2k + 1
2k + 2
cUDwU , r¯U =
L
2γ
1
k + 2
(cUD)
2wU =
(k + 1)(cM )
k
(cUD)k
fe,uwU
µ¯U =
1
2
1
k + 1
cUDwU , p¯iU = fe,u
(cM )
k
(cUD)k
wU
The claim then follows immediately by noting that ∀i ∈ {S,U} and j ∈ {1, 2}
cFTiD = c
j,FT
iD < c
j,A
iD
and
1
w1,AU
<
1
wFTU
<
1
w2,AU
Now consider the skill premium. Consider a set of M countries that are opening up to
trade. Label the countries in order of decreasing skill abundance, i.e.
S1
U1
>
S2
U2
> . . . >
SM
UM
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Then the skill premium in the skill-abundant countries rises as these countries open
up to trade in turn, as proved in the next claim. This is qualitatively consistent with
the fact that the skill premium has risen over the last few decades even as (tariff and
non-tariff) trade barriers have fallen and countries with ever lower levels of skill and
development have opened up to trade. This is where Observation 1 comes in: it says
that the ranking of countries in terms of skill abundance has remained fairly stable
over time. However, as is true of most Heckscher-Ohlin models, the counterfactual
implication that the skill premium decreases in the skill-scarce country is also true in
this environment; a different mechanism (e.g. skill-biased technical change) would have
to be introduced to remedy this shortcoming of the model.
Claim 2.8. The skill premium in the skill-abundant country rises as countries sequen-
tially open up to trade, the sequence in decreasing levels of skill abundance.
Proof. The claim follows from Claim 4, the sequence of inequalities above, and the
simple observation that
U1
S1
<
U1 + U2
S1 + S2
<
U1 + U2 + U3
S1 + S2 + S3
< . . . <
∑M
j=1 U
j∑M
j=1 S
j
⇔ 1
w1U
<
1
w1,2U
<
1
w1,2,3U
< . . . <
1
w1,2,...,MU
where w1,2,...,jU here denotes the return to unskilled labor in a world where only the
countries {1, 2, . . . , j} have opened up to trade.
As mentioned above, there is no margin for inter-sectoral labor reallocations in the
Ventura-like model I’ve been analyzing so far because factors are sector-specific. How-
ever, there are still intra-sectoral reallocations following the opening to free trade and
these are interesting in their own right. I will discuss the more general setup with inter-
as well as intra-sectoral reallocation shortly but focus on this simplified version to isolate
the effect of trade on labor reallocation within sectors.
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Claim 2.9. Labor moves from low to high productivity firms within sectors. Some firms
exit after the move to free trade; other firms survive but hire fewer workers; still other
firms thrive and increase labor demand and output.
Proof. The first statement is easy to show. Denote cj,AiD to be the cutoff value in country
j sector i under autarky, and cFTiD the similar cutoff under free trade. I know from above
that cj,AiD > c
FT
iD hence all firms with inverse productivity c ∈ (cFTiD , cj,AiD ) in country j
sector i exit (i.e. qji (c) = l
j
i (c) = 0) during free trade.
Whether firms produce more or less (and hence hire more or less labor) depends on their
idiosyncractic productivity level. The higher a firm’s productivity level, the greater the
probability it will increase its output in free trade relative to autarky. In particular, I
know
qi(c) =
L
2γ
(ciD − c), ciD =
[
2γfe,ic
K
m(k + 1)(k + 2)
L
] 1
k+2
Relative to autarky, in free trade
LFT > LA, but cFTiD < c
A
iD
These opposing effects imply that for qj,FTi (c) > q
j,A
i (c) iff
c < c˜i = Λ
LFT
k+1
k+2 − LA
k+1
k+2
LFT − LA , Λ = (2γfe,ic
K
m(k + 1)(k + 2))
1
k+2
Hence firms with inverse productivity c < c˜i increase production and hire more labor
while firms with inverse productivity c ∈ (c˜i, cFTiD ) cut back and hire less labor. In this
way labor is reallocated from less productive to more productive firms.
Now that intra-sectoral labor reallocation has been discussed, I turn to the more gen-
eral case where there is also inter-sectoral labor reallocation. In this case, assume the
production function in each sector is of Cobb-Douglas form, i.e. f(si, ui) = si
βiui
1−βi ,
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where 1 > β1 > β2 > 0 so that sector 1 is skill-intensive. Assume country 1 (Home)
is skill-abundant. Given these production functions, I know that costs in each sector
now take on the form κi
wsβiwu1−βi
βi
βi1−βi1−βi , where κi = 1 for the outside good and κi = c for
the differentiated good. Given these assumptions, I now show that both types of labor
move into the comparative advantage sector when going from autarky to free trade.
Claim 2.10. The comparative advantage sector in each country employ a greater share
of both types of labor under free trade. Further, the move from autarky to free trade
increases the share of both types of labor allocated to the comparative advantage sector.
Proof. First I derive the wage of unskilled labor relative to skilled labor in this environ-
ment with factor price equalization and Cobb-Douglas production technology. Normal-
ize skilled wage wS = 1. Denote global revenues by R. I know that
wSSi + wUUi = Ri ⇒ wSS + wUU = R, S =
∑
i
Si, U =
∑
i
Ui
Further, global sector-level labor allocations must satisfy
Si =
βiRi
wS
, Ui =
(1− βi)Ri
wU
⇒ S1 = β1R1
β1R1 + β2R2
⇒ S1 = β1a
β1a+ β2(1− a)
where the last implication follows from
R1
R2
=
a
1− a
Then similarly I obtain
S2 =
β2(1− a)
β1a+ β2(1− a) , U1 =
(1− β1)a
(1− β1)a+ (1− β2)(1− a) , U2 =
(1− β2)(1− a)
(1− β1)a+ (1− β2)(1− a)
Then given that
wSS1 + wUU1
wSS2 + wUU2
=
R1
R2
=
a
1− a
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I have
S1 + wUU1 =
a
1− a [S2 + wUU2]
⇒wU (U1 − a
1− aU2) =
a
1− aS2 − S1
⇒wU = (1− β2)(1− a) + (1− β1)a
β1a+ β2(1− a)
S
U
where I used the (global) sectoral labor allocations derived earlier in the last line.
Given this relative wage, note that the country-level sectoral labor allocations {SHi , UHi , SFi , UFi }
also satisfy
SHi
UHi
=
SFi
UFi
=
wU
wS
βi
1− βi =
βi
1− βiwU
where H is used to denote home or country 1 and F foreign or country 2. Hence
SHi = U
H
1
βi
1− βiwU ⇒ S
H = SH1 + S
H
2 = U
H
1
β1
1− β1wU + U
H
2
β2
1− β2wU
⇒ 1
wU
SH = UH1
β1
1− β1 + (U
H − UH1 )
β2
1− β2
⇒UH1 =
1
wU
SH − β21−β2UH
β1
1−β1 −
β2
1−β2
Similarly I have (imposing market clearing)
UH2 =
β1
1−β1U
H − 1wU SH
β1
1−β1 −
β2
1−β2
SH1 =
β1
1−β1
1
wU
SH − β21−β2
β1
1−β1U
H
β1
1−β1 −
β2
1−β2
SH2 =
β2
1−β2
β1
1−β1U
H − β21−β2 1wU SH
β1
1−β1 −
β2
1−β2
Sectoral labor allocations for the foreign country can be found analogously by simply
replacing UH with UF and SH with SF in the equations above.
56
With the sectoral labor allocations in hand, the rest of the proof is straightforward.
First note that as in the case with no sector-specific factors (and no inter-sectoral la-
bor reallocation), the relative return of the abundant factor rises when we move from
autarky to free trade:
(1− β2)(1− a) + (1− β1)a
β1a+ β2(1− a)
S1
U1
>
(1− β2)(1− a) + (1− β1)a
β1a+ β2(1− a)
S1 + S2
U1 + U2
>
(1− β2)(1− a) + (1− β1)a
β1a+ β2(1− a)
S2
U2
⇔ 1
w1,AU
<
1
wFTU
<
1
w2,AU
Then from the sectoral labor allocations just derived, and the rise in the relative return
of the abundant factor above, I have that
UH,FT1 > U
H,A
1 , U
H,FT
2 < U
H,A
2
SH,FT1 > S
H,A
1 , S
H,FT
2 < S
H,A
2
UF,FT1 < U
F,A
1 , U
F,FT
2 > U
F,A
2
SF,FT1 < S
F,A
1 , S
F,FT
2 > S
F,A
2
which proves the second part of the claim. The first part can be seen by noting that
given β1 > β2, I have
β1
1− β1 −
β2
1− β2 > 0 > −2
β1a+ β2(1− a)
(1− β2)(1− a) + (1− β1)a
which is equivalent to
UH,A1 > U
H,A
2
Coupled with our observations on how free trade compares to autarky, this yields
UH,FT1 > U
H,A
1 > U
H,A
2 > U
H,FT
2
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as desired. Similarly for the foreign country. Then since
SHi
UHi
=
SFi
UFi
=
wU
wS
βi
1− βi
I have
SH,FT1 > S
H,A
1 > S
H,A
2 > S
H,FT
2
and the proof is complete.
2.3.3 Costly Trade
Thus far, I have allowed either no trade or free trade with no impediments whatsoever.
It is instructive to see how the model behaves under these rather extreme assumptions
but the data indicate that the costs to trade, while finite, are nonzero as well. This is
what I turn to next.
Assume now that to ship 1 unit of sector k good to country j from country i, τ ikj ≥ 1
units have to be produced, where τ iki = 1. Without loss of generality denote τ
i
kj by
τk,j > 1 when i 6= j. It is important that τk,j > 1 by allowed to vary by sector k, as will
be made clear shortly.
The demand functions from the consumer’s problem are unchanged, bearing in mind
however that the prices (which are set by monopolistically competitive firms) will reflect
the costs of moving goods across national borders. These demand equations, taken as
given by firms, are
qis,j =
Lj
γ
[α− pis,j(c)−
ηN js (α− p¯js)
γ + ηN jS
]
qiu,j =
Lj
γ
[α− p
i
u,j(c)
wU
−
ηN jU (α− p¯
j
u
wjU
)
γ + ηN jU
]
58
Now that there are trade costs, the cutoff for inverse productivity are no longer neces-
sarily given by the maximum price that firms can charge before demand for their variety
falls to zero. Instead, they vary for exporters and domestic producers and are related
by
τs,jc
i
jSD = c
j
jSD = pjSmax =
γα
γ + ηN jS
− ηN
j
S
γ + ηN jS
p¯jS
τu,jc
i
jUD = c
j
jUD = pjUmaxwU =
γα
γ + ηN jU
− ηN
j
U
γ + ηN jU
p¯jU
wU
Here cijSD is the cutoff for firm inverse productivity of country i firms that want to sell a
skill-intensive differentiated variety in country j, N ji is the total (domestic and foreign)
number of sellers in sector i of country j, and p¯ji is the average price of a differentiated
variety in sector i of country j. Then from the firm’s problem, the first order conditions
are
qis,j(c)−
Lj
γ
pis,j(c)− τs,j
cLj
γ
= 0
qiu,j(c)−
Lj
γ
piu,j(c)
wU
− τu,j cL
j
γ
= 0
Combining this with the demand equations yields the pricing rule
pis,j(c) =
1
2
τs,j(c
i
jSD + c), p
i
u,j(c) =
1
2
τu,j(c
i
jUD + c)wU
Note also that
cijSD =
cjSD
τs,j
, cijUD =
cjUD
τu,j
, ∀i 6= j
where we have suppressed the destination country subscript for the domestic cutoff
(i.e. cjjSD = c
j
SD.) This shows that there is selection into export markets. Because of
trade barriers, not all producing firms can export, and in particular, only firms with
high enough productivity (low enough inverse productivity) will be able to do so. This
implies that exporters on average will have higher productivity. This means that foreign
competition will be tougher, and low productivity firms will exit. The equilibrium cutoff
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(for production) under costly trade is then lower relative to autarky. Mechanically, this
can be seen from the free entry condition, which pins down the cutoff level. For country
i,
Li
4γ
∫ ciSD
0
(ciSD − c)2dG(c) +
Ljτ2s,j
4γ
∫ cijSD
0
(cijSD − c)2dG(c) = fe,s
⇒ Li(ciSD)k+2 + LjρjS(cjSD)k+2 = φSγ
where φS = 2γ(cM )
kfe,s(k + 2), ρ
j
S = (τs,j)
−k
Similarly for country j
⇒ Lj(cjSD)k+2 + LiρiS(ciSD)k+2 = φSγ
This yields domestic cutoff inverse productivity levels for the skill-intensive sector
ciSD =
[
φSγ(1− ρjS)
Li(1− ρiSρjS)
] 1
k+2
, cjSD =
[
φSγ(1− ρiS)
Lj(1− ρiSρjS)
] 1
k+2
,
Likewise, domestic cutoff inverse productivity levels for the other sector are
ciUD =
[
φUγ(1− ρjU )
Li(1− ρiUρjU )
] 1
k+2
, cjUD =
[
φUγ(1− ρiU )
Lj(1− ρiUρjU )
] 1
k+2
,
In Melitz-Ottaviano (2008), as the distribution of exporters’ delivered cost matches the
distribution of domestic firm costs, the distribution of all firm measures in the open
economy setting is the same as in autarky. This property carries over to my model. As
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such, (country-specific) average firm-level performance measures are as before:
c¯iS =
k
k + 1
ciSD, q¯
i
S =
Li
2γ
1
k + 1
ciSD =
(k + 2)(cM )
k
(ciSD)
k+1
fe,s
p¯iS =
2k + 1
2k + 2
ciSD, r¯
i
S =
Li
2γ
1
k + 2
(ciSD)
2 =
(k + 1)(cM )
k
(ciSD)
k
fe,s
µ¯iS =
1
2
1
k + 1
ciSD, p¯i
i
S = fe,s
(cM )
k
(ciSD)
k
c¯iU =
k
k + 1
ciUD, q¯
i
U =
Li
2γ
1
k + 1
ciUD =
(k + 2)(cM )
k
(ciUD)
k+1
fe,u
p¯iU =
2k + 1
2k + 2
ciUDw
i
U , r¯
i
U =
Li
2γ
1
k + 2
(ciUD)
2wiU =
(k + 1)(cM )
k
(ciUD)
k
fe,uw
i
U
µ¯iU =
1
2
1
k + 1
ciUDw
i
U , p¯iU = fe,u
(cM )
k
(ciUD)
k
wiU
We can see from these results that in this setup, as in the data, exporters by being
more productive sell more, hire more workers, and make more profits. Now I am ready
to prove the main claim in this section, which relates the high barriers to service trade
(Observation 2) to lower productivity growth (Duarte and Restuccia, 2010) in the skill-
intensive (Observation 3) service sector.
Claim 2.11. Due to higher trade barriers, the firms in the skill-intensive sector (ser-
vices) have lower average productivity than firms in the other sector under costly trade.
Hence with sector-level cutoffs the same in autarky, this implies lower productivity
growth in the skill-intensive sector.
Proof. For simplicity, trade costs are symmetric bilaterally. By assumption, τs,j >
τu,j , ∀j. This implies ρjS < ρjU , ∀j. Then recall that
cjSD =
[
φSγ(1− ρiS)
Lj(1− ρiSρjS)
] 1
k+2
, cjUD =
[
φUγ(1− ρiU )
Lj(1− ρiUρjU )
] 1
k+2
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Since ρjS < ρ
j
U , ∀j, with fe,s = fe,u (so that φS = φU ), we have
ciSD > c
i
UD, ∀i
Finally, simply note that average sector-level inverse productivity
c¯iU =
k
k + 1
ciUD, c¯
i
S =
k
k + 1
ciSD
is increasing in the inverse productivity cutoff to prove the claim.
2.4 Robustness
I show in this section that the main results derived above continue to hold in the
presence of intermediate goods and capital for particular classes of production functions.
I abstracted from these elements in the earlier discussion as they are not crucial to the
mechanism; they are, however, important empirical objects that need to be incorporated
if the model is to be taken as a plausible representation of reality.
2.4.1 Intermediates
With skilled and unskilled labor as the only factors of production in the baseline model
presented above, technologies take on the form
yi,0 = si,0
βiui,0
1−βi , yi(c) = csi(c)βiui(c)1−βi , i ∈ {1, 2}, 1 > β1 > β2 > 0
Now assume instead that each sector’s output is produced from labor and intermediate
goods, which include the sector’s outside good and full range of differentiated goods.
The sectoral composite good is then consumed or used as an input into the production
of these intermediate goods. With the composite intermediate good produced with the
same technology as the composite final good, we have the following technologies for the
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sectoral intermediate good
Ms = ms,0 + α
∫
ms(i)di− 1
2
γ
∫
[ms(i)]
2di− 1
2
η
[ ∫
ms(i)di
]2
Mu = mu,0 + α
∫
mu(i)di− 1
2
γ
∫
[mu(i)]
2di− 1
2
η
[ ∫
mu(i)di
]2
where Mi denotes the composite intermediate good produced in sector i, which has mi,0
(sector i outside good) andmi(c) (sector i differentiated good) as inputs. Note that while
this class of technologies have not been used extensively in the literature, they exhibit
the concavity and diminishing marginal return properties often considered desirable for
production functions. The degree of substitutibility across inputs is controlled by γ; for
γ = 0 the inputs are perfect substitutes. With η = 0, on the other hand, technology
is quadratic in the individual varieties. The outside and differentiated goods are now
produced with the following technologies
yi,0 = (si,0
βiui,0
1−βi)νM1−νi , yi(c) = c(si(c)
βiui(c)
1−βi)νM1−νi , i ∈ {1, 2}
One can show in this environment that the price of the composite intermediate good
is the same as the price of the sectoral outside good (when all inputs are used in
production), which implies that the consumer problem in the Ventura world (where
factors are sector-specific) can now be written as
max a log(qcs,0 + α
∫
qcs(i)di−
1
2
γ
∫
[qcs(i)]
2di− 1
2
η[
∫
qcs(i)di]
2)
+ (1− a) log(qcu,0 + α
∫
qcu(i)di−
1
2
γ
∫
[qcu(i)]
2di− 1
2
η[
∫
qcu(i)di]
2)
s.t. qcs,0 +m
c
s,0 +
∫
ps(i)[q
c
s(i) +m
c
s(i)]di
+ wU [q
c
u,0 +m
c
u,0] +
∫
pl(i)[q
c
u(i) +m
c
u(i)]di ≤M
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As before, the firms will take the consumers’ demand as given and set prices to maximize
profits. In this world, we obtain for firm with inverse productivity level c
Prices
ps(c) =
1
2
(cSD + c), pU (c) =
1
2
(cUD + c)wU
Markup
µs(c) =
1
2
(cSD − c), µU (c) = 1
2
(cUD − c)wU
Output
ys(c) =
L
γ
(cSD − c), yU (c) = L
γ
(cUD − c)
Demand
qs(c) = ms(c) =
L
2γ
(cSD − c), qU (c) = mU (c) = L
2γ
(cUD − c)
Sales
rs(c) =
L
2γ
(c2SD − c2), rU (c) =
L
2γ
(c2UD − c2)wU
Profits
pis(c) =
L
2γ
(cSD − c)2, piU (c) = L
2γ
(cUD − c)2wU
Comparing these expressions with the ones obtained earlier, it is clear that the same
pricing rule and markup decision obtains. The difference in this setup is that for any
given price, demand is twice as large owing to intermediate (and not just final good)
demand. This implies that expected profits are higher, and hence there is greater entry
and competition, leading to higher productivity (lower inverse productivity) cutoffs.
This can be seen from free entry, which in this case is∫
pis(c)dG(c) = fe,s ⇒ cSD =
[
γfe,sc
K
m(k + 1)(k + 2)
L
] 1
k+2
64∫
piU (c)dG(c) = wUfe,U ⇒ cUD =
[
γfe,Uc
K
m(k + 1)(k + 2)
L
] 1
k+2
With these results, one can go through the proofs to see that all the propositions in
the free trade continue to hold in this economy. As for the costly trade case, the only
important thing to note is that once again cutoffs are scaled down by the factor 2
1
k+2 (for
the same reason as the case above), so that the claim relating higher barriers to service
trade leading to relative slowly productivity growth continue to hold. For completeness,
I specify the domestic cutoffs in the costly trade world to end this section.
Li
2γ
∫ ciSD
0
(ciSD − c)2dG(c) +
Ljτ2s,j
2γ
∫ cijSD
0
(cijSD − c)2dG(c) = fe,s
⇒ Li(ciSD)k+2 + LjρjS(cjSD)k+2 = φ˜Sγ
where φ˜S = γ(cM )
kfe,s(k + 2), ρ
j
S = (τs,j)
−k
ciSD =
[
φ˜Sγ(1− ρjS)
Li(1− ρiSρjS)
] 1
k+2
cjSD =
[
φ˜Sγ(1− ρiS)
Lj(1− ρiSρjS)
] 1
k+2
ciUD =
[
φ˜Uγ(1− ρjU )
Li(1− ρiUρjU )
] 1
k+2
cjUD =
[
φ˜Uγ(1− ρiU )
Lj(1− ρiUρjU )
] 1
k+2
2.4.2 Capital
Now I consider the environment where capital is an input to production and there is
capital accumulation over time. Capital is assumed to be mobile across sectors but not
across countries. Technology at the firm level in this case will be of the Cobb-Douglas
form, while the sectoral investment aggregator will belong to the class of production
functions introduced in the intermediates case above. The capital share ν is assumed
to be the same across goods, sectors, and countries. The composite investment good is
produced with Cobb-Douglas technology having the same income shares as the utility
function. Specifically, we have firm-level technologies given by
yit,0 = (sit,0
βiuit,0
1−βi)1−ν(kit,0)ν , yit(c) = c(sit(c)βiuit(c)1−βi)1−ν(kit(c))ν , i ∈ {1, 2}
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Sector-level technologies given by
Ist = xst,0 + α
∫
xst(i)di− 1
2
γ
∫
[xst(i)]
2di− 1
2
η
[ ∫
xst(i)di
]2
Iut = xut,0 + α
∫
xut(i)di− 1
2
γ
∫
[xut(i)]
2di− 1
2
η
[ ∫
xut(i)di
]2
As mentioned before, this class of technologies exhibit the desirable properties of con-
cavity and diminishing marginal return often required of production functions. The
extent to which inputs are substitutible is controlled by γ; for γ = 0 the inputs are
perfect substitutes. With η = 0, technology is quadratic in the individual varieties.
Finally, the aggregate investment technology is given by
It = a log Ist + (1− a) log Iut
The law of motion for capital is standard and given by
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt
The price of the outside good in sector i in the Ventura-variant of this world is
rνt w
1−ν
it
νν(1−ν)1−ν
where rt is the rental rate of capital and wit is the skill-specific wage as before. Then,
we can write the problem of the household as
max
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
a log(qcst,0 + α
∫
qcst(i)di−
1
2
γ
∫
[qcst(i)]
2di− 1
2
η[
∫
qcst(i)di]
2)
+ (1− a) log(qcut,0 + α
∫
qcut(i)di−
1
2
γ
∫
[qcut(i)]
2di− 1
2
η[
∫
qcut(i)di]
2)
]
s.t.
rνt w
1−ν
st
νν(1− ν)1−ν [q
c
st,0 + x
c
st,0] +
∫
pst(i)[q
c
st(i) + x
c
st(i)]di
+
rνt w
1−ν
ut
νν(1− ν)1−ν [q
c
ut,0 + x
c
ut,0] +
∫
put(i)[q
c
ut(i) + x
c
ut(i)]di ≤Mt
The key difference in this setup relative to all the models considered thus far is that the
household now solves a dynamic problem, with the intertemporal Euler equation char-
acterizing its consumption and investment decisions. What is nice about this dynamic
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setup is that it yields demand equations of a similar form to what obtains in the static
case, so that with firms solving a static problem, we can write performance measures at
any given point in time t for firm with inverse productivity c as
Prices
pst(c) =
1
2
(cSDt + c)
rνt w
1−ν
st
νν(1− ν)1−ν , put(c) =
1
2
(cUDt + c)
rνt w
1−ν
ut
νν(1− ν)1−ν
Markup
µst(c) =
1
2
(cSDt − c) r
ν
t w
1−ν
st
νν(1− ν)1−ν , µut(c) =
1
2
(cUDt − c) r
ν
t w
1−ν
ut
νν(1− ν)1−ν
Output
yst(c) =
L
γ
(cSDt − c), yut(c) = L
γ
(cUDt − c)
Demand
qst(c) = xst(c) =
L
2γ
(cSDt − c), qut(c) = xut(c) = L
2γ
(cUDt − c)
Sales
rst(c) =
L
2γ
(c2SDt − c2)
rνt w
1−ν
st
νν(1− ν)1−ν , rut(c) =
L
2γ
(c2uDt − c2)
rνt w
1−ν
ut
νν(1− ν)1−ν
Profits
pist(c) =
L
2γ
(cSDt − c)2 r
ν
t w
1−ν
st
νν(1− ν)1−ν , piut(c) =
L
2γ
(cUDt − c)2 r
ν
t w
1−ν
ut
νν(1− ν)1−ν
Things are more complicated if firms are allowed to make dynamic decisions; in that case
the distribution of firm-level productivities becomes a state variable (e.g. Ruhl 2008)
unless one assumes that at any period a firm may decide not to produce any quantity.
In that case, the distribution remains the same in each period, as in Chaney (2005), and
we see productivity overshooting in the transition between steady states (with different
τ ’s). These complications are beyond the scope of this paper; we leave them for future
research. In our simplified environment, the key equilibrium objects are the productivity
cutoffs, and these turn out to be the same as in the model with intermediates. Here
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it is investment inputs that are playing the role of intermediate demand, driving up
expected profit, competition and lowering the cutoff inverse productivity (relative to
the economy with no capital or intermediates). In particular, the cutoffs in autarky or
free trade are given by∫
pist(c)dG(c) = fe,s
rνt w
1−ν
st
νν(1− ν)1−ν ⇒ cSDt =
[
γfe,sc
K
m(k + 1)(k + 2)
L
] 1
k+2
∫
piut(c)dG(c) = fe,U
rνt w
1−ν
ut
νν(1− ν)1−ν ⇒ cUDt =
[
γfe,Uc
K
m(k + 1)(k + 2)
L
] 1
k+2
While the domestic cutoffs for costly trade are
Li
2γ
∫ ciSDt
0
(ciSDt − c)2dG(c) +
Ljτ2s,j
2γ
∫ cijSDt
0
(cijSDt − c)2dG(c) = fe,s
⇒ Li(ciSDt)k+2 + LjρjS(cjSDt)k+2 = φ˜Sγ
where φ˜S = γ(cM )
kfe,s(k + 2), ρ
j
S = (τs,j)
−k
ciSDt =
[
φ˜Sγ(1− ρjS)
Li(1− ρiSρjS)
] 1
k+2
cjSDt =
[
φ˜Sγ(1− ρiS)
Lj(1− ρiSρjS)
] 1
k+2
ciUDt =
[
φ˜Uγ(1− ρjU )
Li(1− ρiUρjU )
] 1
k+2
cjUDt =
[
φ˜Uγ(1− ρiU )
Lj(1− ρiUρjU )
] 1
k+2
Again, one can go through the proofs in Section 3 to verify that the main results still
go through and are hence robust to the introduction of capital.
2.5 Conclusion
The explosion in global trade has been one of the starkest developments in the last
fifty years: this is particularly true of merchandise trade, while service trade has lagged
behind. Just as significant has been the structural transformation characterizing the dy-
namics of growth in the developed world: in particular, the rise of the service economy.
This paper draws a connection between these two phenomena by developing a new the-
ory for the structural change in services and presenting supporting evidence regarding
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the service sector. I show that in a Heckscher-Ohlin model with heterogeneous firms,
the lowering of trade barriers leads to the reallocation of labor into the skill-intensive
industry (services) of skill-abundant countries (the developed world). Further, as barri-
ers to trade in the services still remain higher than the rest of the economy, the benefits
accruing to service sector-level productivity as a result of foreign competition have only
been realized to a limited extent, implying lower productivity growth in the services.
The model also features endogenous selection into export markets, with exporters sell-
ing more, hiring more, and being more productive on average than domestic producers.
These model implications are all borne out in the data, and continue to hold in the
presence of intermediate goods and capital. What remains to be seen is how important
service trade is in quantitatively accounting for structural change, the skill premium
and the productivity slowdown in the developed world; this is something I leave for
future research.
% College edu1960 edu1970 edu1980 edu1990 edu2000 edu2010
edu1960 1.0000
edu1970 0.9749 1.0000
edu1980 0.9461 0.9871 1.0000
edu1990 0.8995 0.9582 0.9837 1.0000
edu2000 0.7931 0.8567 0.8988 0.9389 1.0000
edu2010 0.7764 0.8196 0.8546 0.9008 0.9765 1.0000
Table 2.1: Correlation Matrix, % of Population with Completed Higher Education
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Figure 2.1: Skill Abundance Over Time
Figure 2.2: Trade and Labor in Services
70
% Year NSCollege SCollege NSYrsEduc SYrsEduc
1967 6.72 14.23 10.17 11.06
1968 6.64 14.60 10.20 11.13
1969 7.32 14.76 10.34 11.23
1970 7.57 15.60 10.38 11.32
1971 7.47 16.14 10.42 11.39
1972 7.82 16.74 10.52 11.47
1973 8.33 17.74 10.59 11.57
1974 9.16 18.30 10.70 11.64
1975 9.10 18.64 10.73 11.70
1976 9.88 18.98 10.83 11.74
1977 10.20 18.95 10.87 11.78
1978 10.64 19.70 11.01 11.85
1979 11.00 20.32 11.06 11.91
1980 11.56 20.26 11.09 11.94
1981 12.27 21.03 11.16 11.98
1982 13.45 22.24 11.24 12.07
1983 14.14 22.57 11.31 12.11
1984 14.81 22.73 11.37 12.12
1985 15.10 22.82 11.38 12.15
1986 15.76 23.17 11.44 12.18
1987 16.27 23.60 11.47 12.19
1988 15.85 24.55 11.46 12.24
1989 16.08 24.74 11.49 12.27
1990 16.39 24.72 11.53 12.28
1991 13.54 19.97 12.08 12.88
1992 14.27 20.61 12.15 12.97
1993 14.62 21.04 12.22 13.00
1994 15.24 21.72 12.21 13.05
1995 14.70 22.12 12.22 13.05
1996 15.58 22.08 12.26 13.05
1997 15.72 22.61 12.31 13.07
1998 16.12 23.14 12.35 13.10
1999 16.25 23.12 12.36 13.10
2000 16.60 23.62 12.37 13.11
2001 17.22 24.04 12.39 13.14
2002 17.26 24.28 12.35 13.17
2003 18.49 24.48 12.46 13.18
2004 18.62 24.30 12.46 13.17
2005 18.19 24.76 12.46 13.21
2006 18.23 25.66 12.47 13.24
2007 18.60 26.24 12.51 13.30
2008 18.69 26.40 12.48 13.33
2009 19.18 26.68 12.50 13.36
Table 2.2: Skill Intensity Across Sectors - % College and Average No. of Years Educated
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Figure 2.3: Structural Change in Services
Sector % College Share of Total Employed
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.91 4.75
Mining 8.12 0.66
Manufacturing, D 7.74 16.34
Manufacturing, ND 6.76 11.26
Non-Services 6.72 33.01
Transportation 3.71 3.63
Telecommunications 6.29 1.15
Utilities 7.24 1.47
Construction 3.59 5.99
Wholesale Trade 10.27 3.37
Retail Trade 3.89 15.68
Finance, Banks, Real Estate 15.56 4.53
Business Services 11.13 3.07
Personal Services 1.77 6.18
Entertainment, Rec Services 11.94 1.15
Professional Services 38.32 15.39
Public Administration 15.98 5.37
Services 14.23 66.99
Table 2.3: Skill Intensity Across Subsectors in 1968
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Sector % College Share of Total Employed
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 12.16 2.49
Mining 14.04 0.47
Manufacturing, D 20.89 5.99
Manufacturing, ND 21.56 4.06
Non-Services 19.18 13.01
Transportation 13.23 3.12
Telecommunications 32.28 0.75
Utilities 22.94 0.81
Construction 10.52 7.44
Wholesale Trade 28.26 2.47
Retail Trade 13.92 17.79
Finance, Banks, Real Estate 41.20 5.80
Business Services 31.10 7.05
Personal Services 12.85 3.09
Entertainment, Rec Services 27.89 2.60
Professional Services 38.22 23.84
Public Administration 33.70 4.72
Services 26.68 86.99
Table 2.4: Skill Intensity Across Subsectors in 2010
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Sector Code Subsector
Non-Services 00 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing
Non-Services 01 Mining
Services 02 Construction
Non-Services 03 Manufacturing - Durables
Non-Services 04 Manufacturing - Non Durables
Services 05 Transportation
Services 06 Telecommunications
Services 07 Utilities and Sanitary Services
Services 08 Wholesale trade
Services 09 Retail trade
Services 10 Finance, Banking, Real Estate
Services 11 Business and Repair Services
Services 12 Personal Services
Services 13 Entertainment and Recreation Services
Services 14 Professional and Related Services
Services 15 Public Administration
Table 2.5: Sector Classification of March CPS Data
Chapter 3
Bond Auctions and Sovereign
Default
3.1 Introduction
The recent wave of sovereign debt crises has reignited interest in the ways in which
governments renege on their promise to repay their debt. Government debt is typically
issued through bond auctions that are either discriminatory or competitive in nature.
Discriminatory auctions specify different prices for different bonds, depending on the
order in which the bonds are sold. With a competitive auction, all bonds are sold
at the same price, typically the price specified in the highest unsuccessful bid. In
this paper, I consider the intersection of both default and these two different auction
mechanisms. In particular, I ask the following questions. Do countries default more if
they use a discriminatory as opposed to a competitive auction? And how different are
the predictions of standard quantitative sovereign default models when bonds are sold
by auction?
To address these questions, I develop a framework where the government in a small
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open economy deciding on both its debt level and default faces lenders that have down-
ward sloping demand for government bonds. The basic framework is a quantitative
sovereign default model where a small open economy issues bonds through an auction
to lenders with price-elastic demand curves and are hence price takers. This price-taking
assumption is appropriate when there are a large number of bidders and a large number
of units for sale, as is true in this environment. I consider two types of auction mecha-
nisms: discriminatory auctions, where successful bidders pay their bid; and competitive
auctions, where all bidders pay the market clearing stop-out price. The government
issuing the bonds sets a grid of prices and invites bidders to submit demand schedules
for these different prices. Aggregating these demands allows the seller to compute the
stop-out price at which demand and supply are matched. Because bidders in the dis-
criminatory auction must pay their bids for all units demanded up to the stop-out price,
they shade their bids and understate their true willingness to pay. In contrast, bidders
in a competitive auction have no such incentive as all units are sold at the stop-out
price and hence are willing to bid their true valuation. Given the auction yields and its
previous debt, the issuing government can then choose to repay its debt or default and
be excluded from financial markets.
Standard quantitative sovereign default models are characterized by incomplete mar-
kets where governments only have access to a noncontingent bond that can be defaulted
on. Given incompleteness of markets resulting from a single bond, these models typically
adopt a pricing protocol that is only one step removed from that prevalent in single-bond
economies, where the departure simply accounts for the probability of default. Here I
build on this framework by incorporating a price grid and auction markets for this single
bond, so while there is one asset type, different units of this asset are sold at different
prices, and prices depend on the level of demand independent of default. Introducing
default induces two effects. It introduces a positive probability of default, which in turn
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affects the amount of bonds that can be sold by the issuing government. For the regions
of the parameter space that I have explored, both auction environments yield higher
default probabilities and lower borrowing levels than what obtains in the standard en-
vironment where bonds are not auctioned away. Further, while competitive auctions
yield higher revenues than discriminatory auctions in the multi-unit independent-value
environment with risk-neutral buyers considered here when default is not permitted, no
such ranking exists for the environment with default: higher revenue from greater bor-
rowing is no longer guaranteed when higher debt can trigger default. That predictions
for the model incorporating both default and auction elements differ markedly from
both the model with only default and the model with only auctions demonstrate that
the interaction between these two elements matter for the results, notwithstanding its
empirical relevance.
This paper contributes to the body of work focusing on quantitative models that
generate empirically plausible probabilities of default and levels of debt in equilbrium.1
I follow this literature in assuming that the bond seller is a small open economy that
receives a stochastic endowment and decides whether or not to repay its debt in each
period, in the spirit of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). Where I deviate from previous work
is in assuming a pricing protocol where the seller presents a set of prices and allows
risk-neutral lenders to submit bid functions for these prices which when aggregated
then determines the market stop-out price. There are sovereign default papers where
countries can issue bonds with multiple prices. These bonds, however, are typically
different assets: e.g. long- and short-term bonds as in Arellano and Ramanarayanan
(2012) or Hatchondo and Martinez (2009). By contrast, here the same asset can have
a different price depending on the order in which it is sold (discriminatory auction)
or the total number of units sold (competitive auction) - an artifact of the fact that
1 see for example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008), D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2013),
and Yue (2010).
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pricing is determined through a multi-unit auction process. Morever, because bond
pricing differs from that which obtains in the standard environment and also differs
across the different auction formats, the auction mechanism chosen also impacts both
the probability of default and the level of sustainable debt. This then introduces another
element into the academic and policy implications of issuing bonds subject to default:
under what conditions is the auction mechanism chosen optimal, and how different
would our forecasts for both default probabilities and debt levels be if we assume that
bonds are not sold by auction when they really are?
This paper also builds on a large literature studying the optimal auction mechanism
for selling government bonds. Using a special survey on treasury auctions covering 48
countries, Brenner, Galai and Sade (2009) document that market-oriented economies us-
ing common law tend to use competitive auctions while less market-oriented economies
practicing civil law tend to use discriminatory auctions. Not only are both types of auc-
tions utilized in practice, several countries have also switched from one pricing protocol
to another. There is also a large theoretical literature examining the revenue-maximizing
multi-unit auction mechanism under a wide variety of arrangments.2 Ausubel, Cram-
ton, Pycia, Rostek, and Weretka (2014) show that the revenue and efficiency rankings
for the two types of auctions are ambiguous in general; only under certain special condi-
tions is one auction necessarily revenue superior to the other. This paper builds on the
framework in Nautz (1995), who analyzes optimal bidding for a multi-unit auction with
independent values if the seller sets a discrete price grid, by embedding it within a quan-
titative sovereign default model. While the competitive auction is more efficient and
yields greater revenue than the discrimnatory auction in both the discrete-price, risk-
neutral environment in Nautz (1995) and its continuous-price, risk-averse counterpart in
Nautz and Wolfstetter (1997), this is no longer necessarily true in the environment with
2 e.g. Wilson (1972), Milgrom and Weber (1982), Back and Zender (1993), Wang and Zender (2002)
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default as greater borrowing also raises the probability of default which in turn lowers
the revenue of the borrowing country by reducing the price at which its bonds can be
sold. Given the prevalence of defaults documented in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), it
is important to account for its effect on bond prices when examininig the revenue and
efficiency properties of bond auctions, as this paper attempts to do.
The next section presents a simple motivating example. Section 3 presents the model
I use to run the quantitative experiments. The quantitative analysis and main results
are shown in Section 4. The last section concludes. Table and figures can be found in
a separate section following the main references.
3.2 Simple Examples
The benchmark problem for the standard model with default but no auctions is given
by
max
dl,dh,p
u(c1) +
1
2
u(c2h) +
1
2
u(c2l)
c1 = 1 + qp
c2h = max{4− p. 4θ} = dh(4θ) + (1− dh)(4− p)
c2l = max{2− p. 2θ} = dl(2θ) + (1− dl)(2− p)
q =
1
2
(1− dh) + 1
2
(1− dl)
As a first step, I now present the problem for the model with auctions but no default.
Suppose the seller then sets four prices q ∈ {14 , 24 , 34 , 1} in the price grid and the individual
lender’s demand function is given by pi = D(qi) = 4/3(1− qi) for each qi ∈ {14 , 24 , 34 , 1}
so that market demand is given by p = D(q) = 4/3(1 −∑q≥q¯ q) where the stop-out
price is given by q¯.
There are then four cases to consider. Case 1 where the stop-out price is 1/4 and
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demand is p1 = 4/3(1 − 1/4) + 4/3(1 − 2/4) + 4/3(1 − 3/4) + 4/3(1 − 1) = 2 and the
revenue from bonds sold is
∑1 qp = q1p1 + q2p2 + q3p3 + q4p4 = 1/44/3(1 − 1/4) +
2/4(4/3)(1 − 2/4) + 3/4(4/3)(1 − 3/4) + 1/4(4/3)(1 − 1) = 56 so that welfare is given
by W 1 = u(1 +
∑1 qp) + 0.5u(4 − p1) + 0.5u(2 − p1) = u(156) + 0.5u(2) + 0.5u(0).
Case 2 is where the stop-out price is 2/4 and revenue from the bonds sold is
∑2 qp =
q1p1 + q2p2 + q3p3 = 2/4(4/3)(1 − 2/4) + 3/4(4/3)(1 − 3/4) + 1/4(4/3)(1 − 1) = 7/12
and market demand is p2 = +4/3(1−2/4)+4/3(1−3/4)+4/3(1−1) = 1 hence welfare
is W 2 = u(1 712) + 0.5u(3) + 0.5u(1). Case 3 is where the stop-out price is 3/4 and the
revenue is then
∑3 qp = 3/4(4/3)(1− 3/4) and demand p3 = 4/3(1− 3/4) with welfare
being W 3 = u(114) + 0.5u(3
2
3) + 0.5u(1
2
3). The fourth case is identical to autarky in this
example because demand when p = 1 is zero. The seller then chooses to sell pi units of
the bond where W i = maxkW
k.
The example above assumes that bidder bid their true valuation in that market
demand is simply the sum of individual demand up to the stop-out price. This is
relevant to the competitive auction, as it is optimal in this case to bid ones true valuation.
In a discriminatory auction, however, bid-shading is optimal, so that lenders’ bidding
functions will differ from their true demand functions. Consider the following alternative
environment. Suppose the seller sets a three-point distribution q ∈ {13 , 23 , 1} while
the expectations for the stop-out price of the price-taking bidders follow a uniform
distribtion, i.e.
F (q1) = F (
1
3
) =
1
3
, F (q2) = F (
2
3
) =
2
3
, F (q3) = F (1) = 1
Then define for each i the indices i∗ and i∗ that are the minimum and maximum integers
such that Bi = Bi∗+1 = . . . = Bi∗ . Then the optimal bid function B(p) as a function of
a bidder’s true demand function D(p) is given by
B(qi) = D
(
qi∗ + Fi∗
qi∗ − qi∗
Fi∗ − Fi∗
)
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where F (qi∗) = Fi∗ .
Now suppose i = 1 so that B1 > B2 > B3 > 0. Then i∗ = 0 and i∗ = 1 so qi∗ − qi∗ = 13 ,
Fi∗ = 0 and Fi∗ − Fi∗ = 13 . In this case,
B
(
1
3
)
= B(q1) = D
(
qi∗ + Fi∗
qi∗ − qi∗
Fi∗ − Fi∗
)
= D(q1) = D(
1
3
)
Next suppose the stop-out price is q2, i.e. i = 2 so that B2 > B3 > 0 = B1. In this
case, i∗ = 1 and i∗ = 2 so that qi∗ − qi∗ = 13 , Fi∗ = 13 and Fi∗ − Fi∗ = 13 . Hence
B
(
2
3
)
= B(q2) = D
(
qi∗ + Fi∗
qi∗ − qi∗
Fi∗ − Fi∗
)
= D(q2 + F1) = D(1) < D
(
2
3
)
= D(q2)
Note that in contrast to the first case, bid shading occurs here. In fact, bid shading
only does not occur for the limiting case where the price is at the lower bound of its
support (i.e. there is positive demand at all price levels) as we will see shortly.
To complete the discussion, consider the last case where i = 3. In this case B3 >
0 = B1 = B2. In this case, i∗ = 2 and i∗ = 3 so that qi∗ − qi∗ = 13 , Fi∗ = 23 and
Fi∗ − Fi∗ = 13 . Hence
B (1) = B(q3) = D
(
qi∗ + Fi∗
qi∗ − qi∗
Fi∗ − Fi∗
)
= D(q3 + F2 = D
(
5
3
)
< D(1) = D(q3)
Similar to the previous case, bidders understate their own valuation and in this case,
the bid shading is even greater than before.
Turning now to the case with both auctions and default. First consider the case
where the bonds are sold through a competitive auction. In this case, as above, bid-
ders optimally choose to bid their true valuations, so that bidding functions and de-
mand functions coincide. Let the price grid be given by q = [q1, q2, . . . , qN ], where
q1 < q2 < . . . < qN . Let the demand function for price point qi be pi = D(qi) = g − hqi
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for qi ≤ gh , and pi = D(qi) = 0 for qi > gh . The problem for the sovereign issuing bonds
with stop-out price q¯ then becomes
max
dl,dh,p
u(c1) +
1
2
u(c2h) +
1
2
u(c2l)
c1 = 1 + q¯
∑
qi≥q¯
[
D
(
1
1− δ qi
)
−D
(
1
1− δ qi+1
)]
c2h = dh(4θ) + (1− dh)
4−∑
qi≥q¯
[
D
(
1
1− δ qi
)
−D
(
1
1− δ qi+1
)]
c2l = dl(2θ) + (1− dl)
2−∑
qi≥q¯
[
D
(
1
1− δ qi
)
−D
(
1
1− δ qi+1
)]
p =
∑
qi≥q¯
[
D
(
1
1− δ qi
)
−D
(
1
1− δ qi+1
)]
δ =
1
2
dh +
1
2
dl
With a discriminatory auction, bidders shade their bids so that bidding and demand
functions no longer coincide. Let the bidding function for price qi be bi = B(qi) =
D
(
1
1−δ
{
qi∗ + Fi∗
qi∗−qi∗
Fi∗−Fi∗
})
. The problem for the sovereign then becomes
max
dl,dh,p
u(c1) +
1
2
u(c2h) +
1
2
u(c2l)
c1 = 1 +
∑
qi≥q¯
qi[B(qi)−B(qi+1)]
c2h = dh(4θ) + (1− dh)
4−∑
qi≥q¯
[B(qi)−B(qi+1)]

c2l = dl(2θ) + (1− dl)
2−∑
qi≥q¯
[B(qi)−B(qi+1)]

p =
∑
qi≥q¯
[B(qi)−B(qi+1)]
δ =
1
2
dh +
1
2
dl
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Note that the bidding function B(q) here differs from the case without default; in
particular, the argument is scaled by the factor 11−δ to reflect the fact that the bid goes
to zeros (the argument goes to infinity) as the default probability goes to one. Similarly,
we could have written the bid function for the competitive auction with default as B¯(q)
instead of D
(
1
1−δ q
)
; the choice of writing it out explicitly in terms of the demand
function is to contrast it with the case where there is no default, in which case the
bid coincides with the demand function D(q). Once again, the difference lies in the
presence of the default probability; the higher the probability of default, the lower the
corresponding bid (as the argument inside the demand function increases).
3.3 Model
I consider a dynamic model of defaultable debt where debt is sold either through a
competitive or discriminatory auction. A small open economy receives a stochastic
stream of income, y, which follows a Markov process with support Y and transition
function f(yt, yt+1). The economy can sell single-period bonds to risk-neutral lenders
through one of the aforementioned auction formats. The economy can default on its
debt at any time, as financial contracts are unenforceable. If the economy defaults, it
temporarily loses access to international financial markets and suffers output loss every
period it is in default.
Utility for the representative agent in the small open economy (henceforth ”the
seller”) comes from smoothing consumption over time, with preferences given by
E
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
The seller sets a grid of prices q = [q1, q2, . . . , qN ] where q1 < q2 < . . . < qN . He invites
bidders to submit bid functions which we denote
B(q1) ≥ B(q2) ≥ . . . ≥ B(qN )
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where B(qi) gives the number of bonds the bidder would like to buy at price qi. If it
defaults, it operates in autarky. If it does not default, the sovereign faces the following
budget constraint at time t if it operates a discriminatory auction:
ct +
∑
qi,t+1≥q¯t+1
qi,t+1[B(qi,t+1)−B(qi+1,t+1)] = yt +
∑
qi,t≥q¯t
[B(qi,t)−B(qi+1,t)]
if instead it operates a competitive auction, the budget constraint becomes
ct + q¯t+1
∑
qit+1≥q¯t+1
[B(qi,t+1)−B(qi+1,t+1)] = yt +
∑
qi,t≥q¯t
[B(qi,t)−B(qi+1,t)]
The bid functions need not coincide with his true wllingness to pay, which we denote
with demand functions D(qi) for price qi. Denote the inverse demand function by
Z(q) = D−1(q). Aggregating the bid functions allows the seller to compute the stop-
out price, where bond supply and demand coincide. Denote the probability that the
stop-out price is below qi by F (qi), where F reflects the bidder’s expecations over the
distribution of the stop-out price. There is a large number of bidders so every single
bidder behaves as if their actions have no impact over the price distribution, so that
they take prices as given. Bidders, which are the international lenders in this case, are
assumed to be risk-neutral.
3.3.1 Discriminatory Auctions
max
B1,B2,...,BN
N∑
i=1
[Fi − Fi−1]
N∑
j=i
Aj
where Ai =
1− δ
1 + r
∫ Bi
Bi+1
Z(s)ds− qi(Bi −Bi+1)
Bi ≥ Bi+1, ∀i
The nature of demand being monotonic and the constraints being convex ensure that
first order conditions are both necessary and sufficient for an optimum. Then define the
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indices i∗ and i∗ that are the minimum and maximum integers such that Bi = Bi∗+1 =
. . . = Bi∗ . The interpretation is that qi∗ is the highest price below qi at which the
monotonicity requirement Bj ≥ Bj+1 is not binding. And similarly, qi∗ is the lowest
price not below qi at which the monotonicity requirement Bj ≥ Bj+1 is not binding. If
the monotonicity constraint does not bind at qi, then qi∗ = qi−1 and qi∗ = qi.
Proposition 1. The optimal bidding function for the discriminatory auction with de-
fault is given by
B(qi) = D
(
1 + r
1− δ
{
qi∗ + Fi∗
qi∗ − qi∗
Fi∗ − Fi∗
})
Proof. Form the Lagrangian
L(B1, B2, . . . , BN , λ1, . . . , λN ) =
N∑
i=1
FiAi +
N∑
i=1
λi(Bi −Bi+1)
From which I obtain the optimality conditions:
F (qi)
[
1− δ
1 + r
Z(Bi)− qi
]
+ F (qi−1)
[
qi−1 − 1− δ
1 + r
Z(Bi)
]
+ λi − λi−1 = 0
Bi ≥ Bi+1 and λi[Bi −Bi+1] = 0
λi ≥ 0
Then define as above qi∗ is the highest price below qi at which the monotonicity re-
quirement Bj ≥ Bj+1 is not binding. And similarly, qi∗ is the lowest price not below
qi at which the monotonicity requirement Bj ≥ Bj+1 is not binding. This implies
λi∗ = λi∗ = 0 and Bi = Bi∗+1 = . . . = Bi∗ .
Assume that B1 > 0. The bidder does not participate in the auction B1 = 0 if and
only if he is certain his reservation price lies above the stop-out price of the auction
(Z(0) ≤ q1). I assume that lenders stand ready to make at least one bid, which in this
case corresponds to the lowest price on the grid.
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Next assume that there is an index i ∈ (1, . . . , N) such that F (qi) = F (qi−1). Then the
initial first order condition implies that
0 > qi−1 − qi = λi−1 − λi
F (qi)
≥ −λi
F (qi)
Therefore λi > 0 and hence Bi = Bi+1. This means the bidder places a zero bid at
price qi. This is possible given that bidding at the higher price qi instead of at qi−1 is
unncessary if it does not increase the bidder’s chance of winning.
Summing the first of the optimality conditions from i∗ + 1 to i∗ yields
F (qi∗)
[
1− δ
1 + r
Z(Bi)− qi∗
]
= F (qi∗)
[
1− δ
1 + r
Z(Bi)− qi∗
]
which means one cannot gain from reshuﬄing demand from pi∗ to pi∗ . Further, λi∗ = 0
implies F (qi∗) > F (qi∗). Therefore solving the previous equation for Z(Bi) yields
1− δ
1 + r
Z(Bi) =
F (qi∗)qi∗ − F (qi∗)qi∗
F (qi∗)− F (qi∗)
= qi∗ + F (qi∗)
qi∗ − qi∗
F (qi∗)− F (qi∗)
Thus
Bi = D
(
1 + r
1− δ
{
qi∗ + F (qi∗)
qi∗ − qi∗
F (qi∗)− F (qi∗)
})
3.3.2 Competitive Auctions
In contrast to a discriminatory auction, bidders pay the stop-out price for every unit
they receive in a competitive auction. Thus the problem becomes
max
B1,B2,...,BN
N∑
i=1
[Fi − Fi−1]
(∫ Bi
0
1− δ
1 + r
Z(s)ds− qiBi
)
subject to Bi ≥ Bi+1, ∀i
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This turns out to have a much simpler solution. The optimal bid in this environment
is given in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. The optimal bidding function for the competitive auction with default
is given by
B(qi) = D
(
1 + r
1− δ qi
)
Proof. Monotonicity of demand guarantees that the maximization problem is well-
behaved, so that the first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient for an optimum.
These conditions are given by
(Fi − Fi−1)
(
1− δ
1 + r
Z(Bi)− qi
)
= 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , N
Hence
1− δ
1 + r
Z(Bi) = qi ⇒ B(qi) = D
(
1 + r
1− δ qi
)
as desired.
3.3.3 Recursive Formulation
I focus on Markov equilibria and write down the sovereign lender’s problem as a dynamic
program. The problem has two states - the stock of debt bt and income of the economy
yt. At any given state, the value of the option to default is given by
vo(b, y) = max
c,d
{vc(b, y), vd(y)}
where vc(b, y) is the value of continuing in the contract and not defaulting and vd(y) is
the value function under default.
I assume that when default occurs, the sovereign defaults on all debt, and there is no
seniority or partial default. When the borrower defaults, income falls to yd = θy, θ < 1
87
and temporarily operates in autarky; with probability λ the sovereign regains access to
international financial markets the following period so that the value of default is then
vd(y) = u(θyd) + β
∫
y′
[λvo(0, y′) + (1− λ)vd(y′)]f(y, y′)dy′
When the borrower to continue in the contract, his value is given by
vc(b, y) = max
b′,y
{
u(c) + β
∫ ′
y
vo(b′, y′)f(y, y′)dy′
}
subject to the constraints
c = y −
∑
q′i≥q¯′
q′[B(q′i)−B(q′i+1)] +
∑
q≥q¯
[B(qi)−B(qi+1)] if discriminatory
c = y − q¯′
∑
q′i≥q¯′
[B(q′i)−B(q′i+1)] +
∑
q≥q¯
[B(q′i)−B(q′i+1)] if competitive
b =
∑
q≥q¯
B(q), b′ =
∑
q′≥q¯′
B(q′)
Note that the current state b determines the stop-out price q¯ above which all prices on
the price grid have positive demand. Similarly, the choice of b′ determines the stop-out
price next period q¯′ above which all points on the price grid will be equilibrium auction
prices. The bidding function B(q) entering the constraints depends on the auction
mechanism used. With a competitive auction, the bid function for price point qi is
given by
B(qi) = D
(
1 + r
1− δ qi
)
as derived earlier. By contrast, the bid function for price point qi under a discriminatory
auction is given by
B(qi) = D
(
1 + r
1− δ
{
qi∗ + Fi∗
qi∗ − qi∗
Fi∗ − Fi∗
})
where the indices i∗ and i∗ are the minimum and maximum integers such that Bi =
Bi∗+1 = . . . = Bi∗ and F is the lender’s expected distribution over the stop-out price.
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Consistency requires that the default probability δ satisfies
δ(b′, y) =
∫
y′
d(b′, y′)f(y, y′)dy′
where the default policy function satisfies
d(b, y) =
 1 if vc(b, y) ≥ vd(y)0 if vc(b, y) < vd(y)
3.4 Quantitative Analysis
I now solve the model numerically to evaluate how its quantitative predictions differ not
only across the two different auction formats, but also relative to the standard model
with no auction. In this draft, I will simply perform a numerical simulation with the
proper calibration to be done in subsequent revisions. The main goal of the exercise
is to see how introducing the auction component affects average debt levels and the
probability of default.
3.4.1 Parameterization
The period utility function for the sovereign borrower is assumed to be of CRRA form
u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ . The risk aversion coefficient σ is set to two, following Arellano and Ra-
manarayanan (2012) who take their value from business cycle studies. Income can take
only one of two states y ∈ {yl, yh}. The transition probability is given by
Π =
 pil 1− pil
1− pih pih

I find that the value of autarky depends on the levels of β, the coefficient of risk aversion
σ, transition probabilities pih and pil is low, and the difference between yh and yl. The
value of autarky in turn affects the threshold level of current bond holdings below which
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the country will default. To make default more likely, values for these parameters are
assigned the values listed in Table 1 below.
Description Parameter Value
Risk aversion σ 2
Patience β 0.5
Interest rate r 0.01
Transition probability pih 0.7
Transition probability pil 0.5
Income level yh 1
Income level yl 0.01
Demand slope h 0.08
Demand intercept g 1
Reentry probability λ 0
Output cost θ 1
Table 3.1: Default Model Parameterization
The asset space spans the interval [−3, 0], with 401 grid points in total. The price grid
covers the range 11+r [0.95, 1]. I simulate the model 100 times for 10000 periods and
discard the first 500 periods to reduce dependence on initial conditions. I then perform
two experiments, applying the same path of shocks in each case. In the first experiment,
I compare the performance of the standard default model with no auctions against a
model where default is not allowed. This is to establish a benchmark against which
the models with both auctions and default can be compared against, and to isolate
the effects of allowing for (only) default in this model of sovereign debt. The second
experiment then compares the results from (1) the standard model with no auction,
(2) the model with a discriminatory auction, and (3) the model with a competitive
auction. The parameter values chosen above guarantee that default is observed during
the simulated run for each of these models.
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3.4.2 Default vs. No Default
Table 2 presents some sample statistics comparing the overall performance of two mod-
els, one where default is allowed and another where it is not, and bonds are not sold
via auction. It compares these two models along the key dimensions of consumption
and debt, as well as the differences in default probabilities and bond prices. I take
the average across all simulations for assets b and consumption c and find that the
no-default model can sustain significantly higher levels of borrowing (0.3861 vs 0.0741)
which in turn translate to far less variable consumption paths (0.0969 vs 0.2109). Given
my parameterization, I also find that default occurs 2.34% of the time in this standard
default model with no auction which then translates to a slightly lower average bond
price (0.9896 vs 0.9901), relative to what the price would be without default.
Variable No Default Default
mean(b) -0.3861 -0.0741
mean(c) 0.6233 0.6261
var(b) 0.0888 0.0455
var(c) 0.0969 0.2109
q 0.9901 0.9896
default 0 2.34
Table 3.2: Model Statistics (Default vs No Default)
The bond price q faced by a small open economy in the case where there is no default
is the inverse of the risk-free rate. The path of q for the default case is lower when the
default rate is positive. With only two states for income, there are two levels of assets
Bl and Bh > Bl, such that the country defaults no matter what the income shocks is
if b < Bl, defaults for low income shocks if b ∈ [Bl, Bh] (hence repay with probability
1− pil if y = yl and pih if y = yh), and does not default for any income shock if b > Bh.
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Correspondingly, the price function (shown in Figure 1) is
q(b′, y) =

0 b′ < Bl, y ∈ {yl, yh}
1−pil
1+r b
′ ∈ [Bl, Bh], y = yl
pih
1+r b
′ ∈ [Bl, Bh], y = yh
1
1+r b
′ > Bh, y ∈ {yl, yh}
Figure 3.1: Bond Pricing: Default vs No Default
The first 400 periods of one of the simulations run is shown in Figure 2 below.
Observe that consumption is less volatile for the model without default as consumers
can borrow more in states where the income realization and asset holdings are low in
order to smooth consumption over time. After the default, there is no more smoothing
so the relative volatility is higher if we take the whole path compared to taking the
path only up to the default date. The figure below shows one particular path, where
the country defaults after 120 periods and consumes its income afterwards (lives in
autarky).The country that would like to borrow b′ ∈ [Bl, Bh] poses a risk to the lenders
- if tomorrow’s income shock is low it defaults. The probability that the country gets
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yl tomorrow is pil if y = yl today and 1−pih if y = yh today. For the sample path above
there are periods where price is (1 − pil)/(1 + r) since the country is in low states and
wants to borrow b′ in the default region. In the first case the next period’s state is high
so the country does not default, the second time a default occurs.
Figure 3.2: Simulation: Default vs No Default
3.4.3 Default with No Auction vs. Default with Auction
In contrast to the previous subsection, here I focus on the case where default is always
allowed but bonds can be sold via auction. In particular, I consider three different envi-
ronments: the standard environment as in Arellano (2008) where there is no auction, an
environment where bonds are sold through a competitive auction, and another environ-
ment where bonds are sold through a discriminatory auction. Table 3 presents summary
statistics comparing these models along the key dimensions of consumption and debt
and default probabilities. I take the average across all simulations for assets b and
consumption c and find that the standard no-auction default model can sustain higher
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levels of borrowing than the default models with auctions (0.0741 vs 0.0441 or 0.0240)
and borrowing in the competitive auction default model is higher than that sustained
in the discriminatory auction default model. In terms of welfare, consumption is least
volatile in the standard no-auction model and most volatile in the discriminatory auc-
tion default model. I find that default occurs most often in the discriminatory auction
model, with default probabilities (4.70% on average) twice as high as that observed in
the standard no-auction default model (2.34%), where default probabilities are lowest.
This is consistent with the level of sustainable debt being lowest in the discriminatory
auction default, and highest in the standard no-auction default model.
Variable No Auction Competitive Auction Discriminatory Auction
mean(a) -0.0741 -0.0441 -0.0240
mean(c) 0.6261 0.6260 0.6253
var(a) 0.0455 0.0297 0.0180
var(c) 0.2109 0.2163 0.2209
default 2.34 3.23 4.70
Table 3.3: Model Statistics (Auctions Under Default)
As argued earlier, with only two states for income, there are two levels of assets Bl
and Bh > Bl, such that the country defaults no matter what the income shocks is if
b < Bl, defaults for low income shocks if b ∈ [Bl, Bh] (hence repay with probability
1 − pil if y = yl and pih if y = yh), and does not default for any income shock if
b > Bh. The key difference with the introduction of the various auction mechanisms
is that it alters the bond pricing protocol, where instead of a single price, the same
asset can be sold to different sellers at different prices (discriminatory auction) or be
sold at a different price if a different amount is sold (competitive auction). Given my
parameterization, the revenues from the discriminatory auction fall short of the revenues
from the competitive auction, which in turn are lower than that of standard model with
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no auction. The sovereign then defaults in more states of the world in the discriminatory
auction world relative to the competitive auction environment, with the lowest number
of default states occuring in the world with no auction (the standard setup). This
explains the finding shown in Figure 3 that Bnl < B
c
l < B
d
l and B
n
h < B
c
h < B
d
h ,
which in turn translates to the ranking of sustainable debt levels documented earlier.
(Note that prices with auction will not simply be a single point but will be a grid of
various price points; the single-line diagrams used in the figure are simplified to ease
exposition.)
Figure 3.3: Bong Pricing: Auctions under Default
The first 400 periods of one of the simulations run is shown in Figure 4 below. In
contrast to the first experiment (no-default vs. default), here it is not obvious that
consumption in one environment is more variable than another. We do see, however,
that after default occurs around period 120 that consumption simply tracks output
(autarky) and there is far more variability post-default than pre-default. Notice also
that in this particular simulation, while default occurs at the same time for all three
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models, this need not be the case and there are time paths where default occurs in one
of the two auction models but not in the standard model (hence the higher average
default probabilities recorded earlier).
Figure 3.4: Simulation: Auctions under Default
Further, even thougn default occurs at the same time for all three models, the
evolution of assets and consumption differ across these different environments. Note
in particular that the discriminatory model has a double-dip around period 80 while
only a single-dip is observed in the other two environments. This implies that while
b′ ∈ [Bdl , Bnh ] the first time we observe a dip in the asset price so that all three prices fall
to (1 − pil)/(1 + r), b′ ∈ [Bch, Bnh ] the second time a dip occurs, so that the bond price
falls only in the discriminatory auction case as agents will not default on such levels of
debt in the other two environment (see Figure 4 for an intuitive explanation). In these
periods where prices are lower because of default risk, the country is in the low state
and wants to borrow b′ in the default region. In the first few instances the next period’s
state is high so the country does not default, but at period 120 the period next state is
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low and a default occurs.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a quantitative sovereign default model where bonds are sold via
auction, whether discriminatory or competitive. I find that relative to the standard de-
fault model with no auctions, the default models where bonds are auctioned off predict
higher default probabilities and lower debt levels. Relative to the discriminatory auc-
tion, I also find that bonds are more valuable under the competitive auction protocol,
leading to smoother consumption, higher sustainable levels of debt, and lower default
probabilities. Brenner, Galai and Sade (2009) document that both types of auctions
are used in practice, and find that market-oriented economies using common law tend
to use competitive auctions while less market-oriented economies practicing civil law
tend to use discriminatory auctions. It would be instructive to take the competitive
auction default model to Argentinian data to see how different the results are when
one allows for a competitive auction (the empirically relevant case) relative to the case
where bonds are not sold via auction (the standard model). Ecuador, on the other hand,
uses a discriminatory auction to sell debt: in this case, the relevant comparison would
be between the discriminatory auction default model and the standard model with no
auction. There have been also cases where countries have switched from one auction
to another (e.g. the US switch to a competitive auction in the 1990s); in this case, the
relevant experiment would compare the results from the two auction models. I leave
these extensions for future research.
Chapter 4
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Lemma 1. Given f sij = ∞. for all (i, j) such that esij = 0, s ∈ {T,M}, there is no
aggregate entry following policy reform.
Proof. Entry following reform requires that there exists (i, j) such that esij = 0 and
es
′
ij = 1 for s ∈ {T,M}. But this means that pisij < f sij and pis
′
ij ≥ fsij . This cannot be
true given that fsij =∞ and pis
′
ij <∞, pisij <∞.
Lemma 2. Given f sij = 0 for all (i, j) such that e
s
ij = 1, s ∈ {T,M}, then there
is no aggregate exit post-reform.
Proof. Exit following reform requires that there exists (i, j) such that esij = 1 and
es
′
ij = 0 for s ∈ {T,M}. But this means that pisij ≥ fsij and pis
′
ij < f
s
ij . This cannot be
true given that fsij = 0 and pi
s′
ij > 0, pi
s
ij > 0.
Lemma 3. If there is no aggregate entry and exit following policy reform, dividend per
share stays unchanged (pi′ = pi).
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Proof. Recall the expression for dividend per share
pi =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1
∑
s=M,T wjLj [µ
1
σ
( pSij
PSi
)1−σ
wiLi
(
1
1−α + 2pi
)
− fSij ]eSij
2
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i=1wiLi
Rearranging to isolate the terms that are functions of pi to yield
2
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Similarly, post-reform we have
2
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wiLi −
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To see that pi = pi′, it suffices to note that for any S ∈ {T,M}, i = 1, 2, . . . , N we have
N∑
j=1
wjLj
[
pS
′
ij
1−σ
eS
′
ij
]
= PS
′
i
1−σ
N∑
j=1
wjLj
[
pSij
1−σ
eSij
]
= PSi
1−σ
and because there is no aggregate entry or exit, eS
′
ij = e
S
ij , ∀(S, i, j), so that∑
s=M,T
wjLjf
S
ije
S′
ij =
∑
s=M,T
wjLjf
S
ije
S
ij
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Hence
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∑N
j=1
∑
s=M,T wjLj
[
µ 1σ
( pSij
PSi
)1−σ
wiLi
]
eSij −
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1
∑
s=M,T wjLjf
S
ije
S
ij
2
{∑N
i=1wiLi −
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1
∑
s=M,T wjLj
[
µ 1σ
( pSij
PSi
)1−σ
wiLi
]
eSij
}
=
1
1−α
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1
∑
s=M,T wjLj
[
µ 1σ
( pS′ij
PS
′
i
)1−σ
wiLi
]
eS
′
ij −
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1
∑
s=M,T wjLjf
S
ije
S′
ij
2
{∑N
i=1wiLi −
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1
∑
s=M,T wjLj
[
µ 1σ
( pS′ij
PS
′
i
)1−σ
wiLi
]
eS
′
ij
} = pi′
Proposition 1. The welfare gains computed in the limiting parameterization given by
fsij = 0 for all (i, j) such that e
s
ij = 1, s ∈ {T,M} and fsij = ∞ for all (i, j) such that
esij = 0, s ∈ {T,M} coincide with the welfare gains in an alternative parameterization
of fixed costs where fsij = f for all (i, j) such that e
s
ij = 1, s ∈ {T,M} and fsij = f¯ for
all (i, j) such that esij = 0, s ∈ {T,M} where f is sufficiently small and f¯ is sufficiently
large to ensure that there is no aggregate entry or exit post-reform.
Proof. Denote the equilibrium objects that arise from the alternative parameteri-
zation with hats, e.g. Pˆi, Wˆ . We know given that there is no aggregate entry or exit
post-reform, Lemma 3 implies that pi′ = pˆi (even as pˆi 6= pi). Next note that because
eˆ′Sij = e
′S
ij = e
S
ij for all i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N and S ∈ {T,M} we have PS
′
i = Pˆ
S′
i for all
i = 1, 2, . . . , N and S ∈ {T,M}. The normalization stipulates that P0 = P ′0 = 1. Then
given that welfare is given by
Wi = Γ+log
{
wiLi
(
1
1− α + 2pi
)}
−(1−2µ) logP0−µ logPMi −µ logP Ti = Γ log
wiLi
(
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)
P 1−2µ0 PMi
µ
P Ti
µ

We have that the gains from openness are given by
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= log
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′
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µ
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µ
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Hence
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as desired. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2. (i) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j
such that τT
′
ij = τ
T
ij and e
T
ij = 0, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i do
not enter destination j pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them are not affected
by the policy change. Then there exists a cutoff xi1 for each i such that for firms from
countries with cost cTij ≥ xi1, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eT
′
ij = 0)
while firms from countries with cost cTik < xi1 choose to enter after the reform (e
T ′
ik = 1).
Proof. Suppose not, and there exists j, k such that eT
′
ij = 1, e
T ′
ik = 0 but c
T
ij ≥ xi1, cTik <
xi1. This pair of inequalities imply that pi
T
ik > pi
T
ij . We also know from e
T
ij = 0, e
T
ik = 0
that
piTij < f
T
ij = pi
T
ij + 
piTik < f
T
ik = pi
T
ik + 
where  > 0 is a small positive number. Note that
piT
′
ik
piTik
=
(P T ′i
P Ti
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
piT
′
ij
piTij
=
(P T ′i
P Ti
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
So that the change in bilateral gross profits (through the price index and income from
dividends) due to the reform for both j and k are the same. Denote this change by δ,
i.e.
δ =
(P T ′i
P Ti
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
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Given that eT
′
ij = 1, e
T ′
ik = 0, we also know that pi
T ′
ij ≥ fTij and piT
′
ik < f
T
ik. Take the first
of these two inequalities. We have
piT
′
ij ≥ fTij ⇒ piT
′
ij ≥ piTij +  ⇒ (δ − 1)piTij ≥  ⇒ δ − 1 ≥

piTij
Then the last inequality implies
(δ − 1)piTik ≥
piTik
piTij
⇒ piT ′ik − piTik ≥
piTik
piTij
⇒ piT ′ik ≥ piTik +
piTik
piTij
However, combining this with piT
′
ik < f
T
ik = pi
T
ik +  yields
piTik +
piTik
piTij
≤ piT ′ik < fTik = piTik + 
which is a contradiction as piTik > pi
T
ij .
(ii) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τT
′
ij = τ
T
ij
and eTij = 1, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i enter destination j
pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them are not affected by the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi2 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
cTij ≥ xi2, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eT
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cTik < xi2 choose to enter after the reform (e
T ′
ik = 1).
Proof. Suppose not, and there exists j, k such that eT
′
ij = 1, e
T ′
ik = 0 but c
T
ij ≥ xi2, cTik <
xi2. This pair of inequalities imply that pi
T
ik > pi
T
ij . We also know from e
T
ij = 1, e
T
ik = 1
that
piTij > f
T
ij = 
piTik > f
T
ik = 
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where  > 0 is a small positive number. Note that
piT
′
ik
piTik
=
(P T ′i
P Ti
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
piT
′
ij
piTij
=
(P T ′i
P Ti
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
So that the change in bilateral gross profits (through the price index and income from
dividends) due to the reform for both j and k are the same. Denote this change by δ,
i.e.
δ =
(P T ′i
P Ti
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
Given that eT
′
ij = 1, e
T ′
ik = 0, we also know that pi
T ′
ij ≥ fTij and piT
′
ik < f
T
ik. Take the
second of these two inequalities. We have
piT
′
ik < f
T
ik ⇒ piT
′
ik <  ⇒ δpiTik <  ⇒ δ <

piTik
Then the last inequality implies
δpiTij <
piTij
piTik
⇒ piT ′ij <
piTij
piTik
⇒ piT ′ij < 
where the last implication comes from piTik > pi
T
ij . This is a contradiction as pi
T ′
ij ≥ fTij = .
(iii) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τT
′
ij < τ
T
ij
and eTij = 1, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i enter destination j
pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them fall as a result of the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi3 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
cTij ≥ xi3, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eT
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cTik < xi3 choose to enter after the reform (e
T ′
ik = 1).
Proof. Suppose not, and there exists j, k such that eT
′
ij = 1, e
T ′
ik = 0 but c
T
ij ≥ xi3, cTik <
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xi3. This pair of inequalities imply that pi
T
ik > pi
T
ij . We also know from e
T
ij = 1, e
T
ik = 1
that
piTij > f
T
ij = 
piTik > f
T
ik = 
where  > 0 is a small positive number. Note that
piT
′
ik
piTik
=
(τT ′ik
τTik
)1−σ(P T ′i
P Ti
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
piT
′
ij
piTij
=
(τT ′ij
τTij
)1−σ(P T ′i
P Ti
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
Because τT
′
ik /τ
T
ik = τ
T ′
ij /τ
T
ij the change in bilateral gross profits due to the reform for
both j and k are the same. Denote this change by δ, i.e.
δ =
(τT ′ij
τTij
)1−σ(P T ′i
P Ti
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
Given that eT
′
ij = 1, e
T ′
ik = 0, we also know that pi
T ′
ij ≥ fTij and piT
′
ik < f
T
ik. Take the first
of these two inequalities. We have
piT
′
ik < f
T
ik ⇒ piT
′
ik <  ⇒ δpiTik <  ⇒ δ <

piTik
Then the last inequality implies
δpiTij <
piTij
piTik
⇒ piT ′ij <
piTij
piTik
⇒ piT ′ij < 
where the last implication comes from piTik > pi
T
ij . This is a contradiction as pi
T ′
ij ≥ fTij = .
(iv) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τT
′
ij < τ
T
ij
and eTij = 0, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i do not enter destination
j pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them fall as a result of the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi4 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
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cTij ≥ xi4, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eT
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cTik < xi4 choose to enter after the reform (e
T ′
ik = 1).
Proof. Suppose not, and there exists j, k such that eT
′
ij = 1, e
T ′
ik = 0 but c
T
ij ≥ xi4, cTik <
xi4. This pair of inequalities imply that pi
T
ik > pi
T
ij . We also know from e
T
ij = 0, e
T
ik = 0
that
piTij < f
T
ij = pi
T
ij + 
piTik < f
T
ik = pi
T
ik + 
where  > 0 is a small positive number. Note that
piT
′
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piTik
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)1−σ(P T ′i
P Ti
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piT
′
ij
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=
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Because τT
′
ik /τ
T
ik = τ
T ′
ij /τ
T
ij the change in bilateral gross profits due to the reform for
both j and k are the same. Denote this change by δ, i.e.
δ =
(τT ′ij
τTij
)1−σ(P T ′i
P Ti
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
Given that eT
′
ij = 1, e
T ′
ik = 0, we also know that pi
T ′
ij ≥ fTij and piT
′
ik < f
T
ik. Take the first
of these two inequalities. We have
piT
′
ij ≥ fTij ⇒ piT
′
ij ≥ piTij +  ⇒ (δ − 1)piTij ≥  ⇒ δ − 1 ≥

piTij
Then the last inequality implies
(δ − 1)piTik ≥
piTik
piTij
⇒ piT ′ik − piTik ≥
piTik
piTij
⇒ piT ′ik ≥ piTik +
piTik
piTij
However, combining this with piT
′
ik < f
T
ik = pi
T
ik +  yields
piTik +
piTik
piTij
≤ piT ′ik < fTik = piTik + 
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which is a contradiction as piTik > pi
T
ij .
(v) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τM
′
ij = τ
M
ij
and eMij = 0, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i do not enter destination
j pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them are not affected by the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi5 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
cMij ≥ xi5, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eM
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cMik < xi5 choose to enter after the reform (e
M ′
ik = 1).
Proof. Suppose not, and there exists j, k such that eM
′
ij = 1, e
M ′
ik = 0 but c
M
ij ≥ xi5, cMik <
xi5. This pair of inequalities imply that pi
M
ik > pi
M
ij . We also know from e
M
ij = 0, e
M
ik = 0
that
piMij < f
M
ij = pi
M
ij + 
piMik < f
M
ik = pi
M
ik + 
where  > 0 is a small positive number. Note that
piM
′
ik
piMik
=
(PM ′i
PMi
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
piM
′
ij
piMij
=
(PM ′i
PMi
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
So that the change in bilateral gross profits (through the price index and income from
dividends) due to the reform for both j and k are the same. Denote this change by δ,
i.e.
δ =
(PM ′i
PMi
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
Given that eM
′
ij = 1, e
M ′
ik = 0, we also know that pi
M ′
ij ≥ fMij and piM
′
ik < f
M
ik . Take the
first of these two inequalities. We have
piM
′
ij ≥ fMij ⇒ piM
′
ij ≥ piMij +  ⇒ (δ − 1)piMij ≥  ⇒ δ − 1 ≥

piMij
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Then the last inequality implies
(δ − 1)piMik ≥
piMik
piMij
⇒ piM ′ik − piMik ≥
piMik
piMij
⇒ piM ′ik ≥ piMik +
piMik
piMij
However, combining this with piM
′
ik < f
M
ik = pi
M
ik +  yields
piMik +
piMik
piMij
≤ piM ′ik < fMik = piMik + 
which is a contradiction as piMik > pi
M
ij .
(vi) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τM
′
ij = τ
M
ij
and eMij = 1, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i enter destination j
pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them are not affected by the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi6 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
cMij ≥ xi6, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eM
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cMik < xi6 choose to enter after the reform (e
M ′
ik = 1).
Proof. Suppose not, and there exists j, k such that eM
′
ij = 1, e
M ′
ik = 0 but c
M
ij ≥ xi6, cMik <
xi6. This pair of inequalities imply that pi
M
ik > pi
M
ij . We also know from e
M
ij = 1, e
M
ik = 1
that
piMij > f
M
ij = 
piMik > f
M
ik = 
where  > 0 is a small positive number. Note that
piM
′
ik
piMik
=
(PM ′i
PMi
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
piM
′
ij
piMij
=
(PM ′i
PMi
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
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So that the change in bilateral gross profits (through the price index and income from
dividends) due to the reform for both j and k are the same. Denote this change by δ,
i.e.
δ =
(PM ′i
PMi
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
Given that eM
′
ij = 1, e
M ′
ik = 0, we also know that pi
M ′
ij ≥ fMij and piM
′
ik < f
M
ik . Take the
second of these two inequalities. We have
piM
′
ik < f
M
ik ⇒ piM
′
ik <  ⇒ δpiMik <  ⇒ δ <

piMik
Then the last inequality implies
δpiMij <
piMij
piMik
⇒ piM ′ij <
piMij
piMik
⇒ piM ′ij < 
where the last implication comes from piMik > pi
M
ij . This is a contradiction as pi
M ′
ij ≥
fMij = .
(vii) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τM
′
ij < τ
M
ij
and eMij = 1, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i enter destination j
pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them fall as a result of the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi7 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
cMij ≥ xi7, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eM
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cMik < xi7 choose to enter after the reform (e
M ′
ik = 1).
Proof. Suppose not, and there exists j, k such that eM
′
ij = 1, e
M ′
ik = 0 but c
M
ij ≥ xi7, cMik <
xi7. This pair of inequalities imply that pi
M
ik > pi
M
ij . We also know from e
M
ij = 1, e
M
ik = 1
that
piMij > f
M
ij = 
piMik > f
M
ik = 
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where  > 0 is a small positive number. Note that
piM
′
ik
piMik
=
(τM ′ik
τMik
)1−σ(PM ′i
PMi
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
piM
′
ij
piMij
=
(τM ′ij
τMij
)1−σ(PM ′i
PMi
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
Because τM
′
ik /τ
M
ik = τ
M ′
ij /τ
M
ij the change in bilateral gross profits due to the reform for
both j and k are the same. Denote this change by δ, i.e.
δ =
(τM ′ij
τMij
)1−σ(PM ′i
PMi
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
Given that eM
′
ij = 1, e
M ′
ik = 0, we also know that pi
M ′
ij ≥ fMij and piM
′
ik < f
M
ik . Take the
first of these two inequalities. We have
piM
′
ik < f
M
ik ⇒ piM
′
ik <  ⇒ δpiMik <  ⇒ δ <

piMik
Then the last inequality implies
δpiMij <
piMij
piMik
⇒ piM ′ij <
piMij
piMik
⇒ piM ′ij < 
where the last implication comes from piMik > pi
M
ij . This is a contradiction as pi
M ′
ij ≥
fMij = .
(viii) Fix destination country i. Consider firms from all countries j such that τM
′
ij < τ
M
ij
and eMij = 0, i.e. all country pairs where the firms from source i do not enter destination
j pre-reform, and the iceberg costs between them fall as a result of the policy change.
Then there exists a cutoff xi8 for each i such that for firms from countries with cost
cMij ≥ xi8, the optimal choice is not to enter after the reform (eM
′
ij = 0) while firms from
countries with cost cMik < xi8 choose to enter after the reform (e
M ′
ik = 1).
Proof. Suppose not, and there exists j, k such that eM
′
ij = 1, e
M ′
ik = 0 but c
M
ij ≥ xi8, cMik <
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xi8. This pair of inequalities imply that pi
M
ik > pi
M
ij . We also know from e
M
ij = 0, e
M
ik = 0
that
piMij < f
M
ij = pi
M
ij + 
piMik < f
M
ik = pi
M
ik + 
where  > 0 is a small positive number. Note that
piM
′
ik
piMik
=
(τM ′ik
τMik
)1−σ(PM ′i
PMi
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
piM
′
ij
piMij
=
(τM ′ij
τMij
)1−σ(PM ′i
PMi
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
Because τM
′
ik /τ
M
ik = τ
M ′
ij /τ
M
ij the change in bilateral gross profits due to the reform for
both j and k are the same. Denote this change by δ, i.e.
δ =
(τM ′ij
τMij
)1−σ(PM ′i
PMi
)σ−1Y ′i
Yi
Given that eM
′
ij = 1, e
M ′
ik = 0, we also know that pi
M ′
ij ≥ fMij and piM
′
ik < f
M
ik . Take the
first of these two inequalities. We have
piM
′
ij ≥ fMij ⇒ piM
′
ij ≥ piMij +  ⇒ (δ − 1)piMij ≥  ⇒ δ − 1 ≥

piMij
Then the last inequality implies
(δ − 1)piMik ≥
piMik
piMij
⇒ piM ′ik − piMik ≥
piMik
piMij
⇒ piM ′ik ≥ piMik +
piMik
piMij
However, combining this with piM
′
ik < f
M
ik = pi
M
ik +  yields
piMik +
piMik
piMij
≤ piM ′ik < fMik = piMik + 
which is a contradiction as piMik > pi
M
ij .
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A.2 Computational Algorithm
Step 1: Parameterize the distribution of decision rules e′ij for all i, j as follows:
eT
′
ij =

0 if τT
′
ij = τ
T
ij , e
T
ij = 0, c
T
ij ≥ x′i1
1 if τT
′
ij = τ
T
ij , e
T
ij = 0, c
T
ij < x
′
i1
0 if τT
′
ij = τ
T
ij , e
T
ij = 1, c
T
ij ≥ x′i2
1 if τT
′
ij = τ
T
ij , e
T
ij = 1, c
T
ij < x
′
i2
0 if τT
′
ij < τ
T
ij , e
T
ij = 1, c
T
ij ≥ x′i3
1 if τT
′
ij < τ
T
ij , e
T
ij = 1, c
T
ij < x
′
i3
0 if τT
′
ij < τ
T
ij , e
T
ij = 0, c
T
ij ≥ x′i4
1 if τT
′
ij < τ
T
ij , e
T
ij = 0, c
T
ij < x
′
i4
eM
′
ij =

0 if τM
′
ij = τ
M
ij , e
M
ij = 0, c
M
ij ≥ x′i5
1 if τM
′
ij = τ
M
ij , e
M
ij = 0, c
M
ij < x
′
i5
0 if τM
′
ij = τ
M
ij , e
M
ij = 1, c
M
ij ≥ x′i6
1 if τM
′
ij = τ
M
ij , e
M
ij = 1, c
M
ij < x
′
i6
0 if τM
′
ij < τ
M
ij , e
M
ij = 1, c
M
ij ≥ x′i7
1 if τM
′
ij < τ
M
ij , e
M
ij = 1, c
M
ij < x
′
i7
0 if τM
′
ij < τ
M
ij , e
M
ij = 0, c
M
ij ≥ x′i8
1 if τM
′
ij < τ
M
ij , e
M
ij = 0, c
M
ij < x
′
i8
Note the similarity between these decision rules and the lemmata proved earlier.
Step 2: Guess an initial vector of cutoffs {(xi1, xi2, xi3, xi4, xi5, xi6, xi7, xi8)}i=1,2,...,N . Do
this with percentiles of the elements in the 8N sets {Ωi1,Ωi2,Ωi3,Ωi4,Ωi5,Ωi6,Ωi7,Ωi8}i=1,2,...,N ,
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defined by
Ωi1 = {j : τT ′ij = τTij , eTij = 0}
Ωi2 = {j : τT ′ij = τTij , eTij = 1}
Ωi3 = {j : τT ′ij < τTij , eTij = 1}
Ωi4 = {j : τT ′ij < τTij , eTij = 0}
Ωi5 = {j : τM ′ij = τMij , eMij = 0}
Ωi6 = {j : τM ′ij = τMij , eMij = 1}
Ωi7 = {j : τM ′ij < τMij , eMij = 1}
Ωi8 = {j : τM ′ij < τMij , eMij = 0}
A cutoff xih is then associated with the percentile kih = 100|Ωˆih|/|Ωih| for h = 1, 2, 3, . . . , 8,
where Ωˆih = {j : j ∈ Ωih, cij < xih}.
Step 3: Given the parameterization of the decision rules and guess for the cutoffs,
we can then compute what the prices indices P ti are for all i as well as the dividend per
share pit. Here the superscript t denotes the t-th iteration.
Step 4: Given the price indices P ti and dividend per share pi
t, we can compute the
decision rule e′ij for firms from each source country j and destination country i. Denote
this matrix (i.e. distribution) of decision rules by E. These decision rules then yield
price indices Pni and dividend per share pi
n.
Step 5: Given the price indices Pni and dividend per share pi
n, we can construct the
profits pinij that firms from j can make by exporting to i and compare this against the
corresponding fixed cost fij to determine the entry pattern e
′n
ij . Denote the matrix of
such entry patterns by En. If E = En then we are done.
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Step 6: If E 6= En, check if the cutoff rules implied by the decision rules just ob-
tained knih coincide with the guess for the cutoff rules k
t
ih. If yes, then terminate; in
this case we obtain an approximate equilibrium as no further updating can be done and
E 6= En. If no, then proceed to update the cutoffs according to kt+1ih = λknih+ (1−λ)ktih
where the step size is λ ∈ (0, 1). The cutoff rules implied by the decision rules e′ij are
constructed as follows: knih = 100|Ωˆnih|/|Ωih| where
Ωˆni1 = {j : j ∈ Ωi1, eT
′
ij = 1}
Ωˆni2 = {j : j ∈ Ωi2, eT
′
ij = 1}
Ωˆni3 = {j : j ∈ Ωi3, eT
′
ij = 1}
Ωˆni4 = {j : j ∈ Ωi4, eT
′
ij = 1}
Ωˆni5 = {j : j ∈ Ωi5, eM
′
ij = 1}
Ωˆni6 = {j : j ∈ Ωi6, eM
′
ij = 1}
Ωˆni7 = {j : j ∈ Ωi7, eM
′
ij = 1}
Ωˆni8 = {j : j ∈ Ωi8, eM
′
ij = 1}
With the updated cutoff rules, return to Step 3 and iterate until convergence.
A.3 Two-Country Example
A.3.1 Introduction
There are two countries i = 1, 2. Each has a measure θi = wiLi of firms that are
considering which markets to enter. For simplicity consider only an environment with
trade (i.e. no multinational production). International trade is subject to both iceberg
and fixed costs, which can be asymmetric across country pairs. Consider a policy reform
that lowers the iceberg costs for firms from 2 to export to 1 from τ12 = 2 to τ
′
12 = 1.
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Let τ21 = τ
′
21 = 1. The trade elasticity is σ = 2 and the expenditure share for the
differentiated goods sector is µ = 1/2. The other exogenous parameters are given below
w1 = 1, w2 = 1, L1 = 1, L2 = 1, φ1 = 2, φ2 = 1
This implies
p11 = p
′
11 = 1, p22 = p
′
22 = 2, p12 =
σ
σ − 1
w2τ12
φ2
= 4, p21 =
σ
σ − 1
w1τ21
φ1
= 1, p′12 =
σ
σ − 1
w2τ
′
12
φ2
= 2
Now we will look at the equilibria that can arise given different values for (f12, f21), i.e.
we will partition the f12 − f21 space into the regions where the four cases (e12, e21) ∈
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} apply. We will do this both pre-reform and post-reform.
Note: In general, one should consider not only four cases, but sixteen cases, as entry
decisions e11, e22 are also binary choice variables that can be 0 or 1. To ease exposition,
I assume throughout this illustration that these decisions are e11 = 1 and e22 = 1.
Note that given our assumptions on the values of the parameters, the profit for a firm
from j exporting to i denoted by piij is simply given by
piij = µ
1
σ
(pij
Pi
)1−σ
wiLi(1 + pi) =
1
2
1
2
(pij
Pi
)−1
(1 + pi) =
1
4
Pi
pij
(1 + pi)
This will be useful for the characterization that follows.
A.3.2 Pre-Reform
Case 1: (e12, e21) = (0, 0)
In this equilibrium, firms only operate domestically and there is no entry into interna-
tional markets either way. Hence we have
P1 = p11 = 1, P2 = p22 = 2
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In this case we also have pi = 13 , and
pi11 =
1
4
(1 + pi)
pi12 =
1
4
P1
p12
(1 + pi) =
1
16
(1 + pi) =
1
16
4
3
=
1
12
≤ f12
pi21 =
1
4
P2
p21
(1 + pi) =
1
2
(1 + pi) =
2
3
≤ f21
pi22 =
1
4
P2
p22
=
1
4
(1 + pi) =
1
3
Case 2: (e12, e21) = (0, 1)
In this equilibrium, country 2 firms enter (i.e. exports to) country 1 but not the other
way around. Hence we have
P1 = p11 = 1, P2 = [p
−1
21 + p
−1
22 ]
−1 =
2
3
In this case we have
pi11 =
1
4
(1 + pi)
pi12 =
1
16
(1 + pi)
pi21 =
1
4
2/3
1
(1 + pi) =
1
6
(1 + pi)
pi22 =
1
4
2/3
2
=
1
12
(1 + pi)
Hence
pi =
3+2+1
12 (1 + pi)− f21
2
=
1
3
− 2
3
f21
It is instructive to note that
pimax =
1
3
, f21 = 0
pimin =
1
6
(1 + pimin)⇒ pimin = 1
5
, f21 =
1
5
In general
pi21 =
1
16
(4
3
− 2
3
f21
)
=
1
12
− 1
24
f21 ≤ f12, forf21 ∈ (0, 1
5
)
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Case 3: (e12, e21) = (1, 0)
In this equilibrium, country 1 firms enter (i.e. exports to) country 2 but not the other
way around. Hence we have
P1 = [p
−1
11 + p
−1
12 ]
−1 =
4
5
, P2 = p22 = 2
In this case we have
pi11 =
1
4
P1
p11
(1 + pi) =
1
4
4
5
(1 + pi) =
1
5
(1 + pi)
pi12 =
1
4
P1
p12
(1 + pi) =
1
4
4/5
4
(1 + pi) =
1
20
(1 + pi)
pi21 =
1
4
P2
p21
(1 + pi) =
1
4
2
1
(1 + pi) =
1
2
(1 + pi)
pi22 =
1
4
P2
p22
(1 + pi) =
1
4
(1 + pi)
Hence
pi =
5+4+1
20 (1 + pi)− f12
2
=
1
3
− 2
3
f12
It is instructive to note that
pimax =
1
3
, f12 = 0
pimin =
5+4
20 (1 + pi)
2
=
9
40
(1 + pimin)⇒ pimin = 9
31
, f12 =
2
31
In general
pi21 =
1
2
(4
3
− 2
3
f12
)
=
2
3
− 1
3
f12 ≤ f21, forf12 ∈ (0, 2
13
)
Case 4: (e12, e21) = (1, 1)
In this equilibrium, country 1 firms enter (i.e. exports to) country 2 and vice versa.
Hence we have
P1 = [p
−1
11 + p
−1
12 ]
−1 =
4
5
, P2 = [p
−1
21 + p
−1
22 ]
−1 =
2
3
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In this case we have
pi11 =
1
5
(1 + pi)
pi12 =
1
20
(1 + pi)
pi21 =
1
6
(1 + pi)
pi22 =
1
12
(1 + pi)
Hence
pi =
1
3
− 2
3
(f12 + f21)
pimax =
1
3
, f12 = 0, f21 = 0
pimin =
5+12
60 (1 + pi)
2
=
17
120
(1 + pimin)⇒ pimin = 17
103
, f21 =
1
20
120
103
=
6
103
, f12 =
1
6
120
103
=
20
103
In general
pi12 =
1
20
(4
3
− 2
3
f12 − 2
3
f21
)
=
2
30
− 1
30
f12 − 1
30
f21 ≤ f12
pi21 =
1
6
(4
3
− 2
3
f12 − 2
3
f21
)
=
2
9
− 1
9
f12 − 1
9
f21 ≤ f21
This implies
f12 ≤ 30
31
( 2
30
− 1
30
f21
)
f21 ≤ 9
10
(2
9
− 1
9
f12
)
Hence the endpoints are {( 231 , 0), (0, 210)}.
A.3.3 Post-Reform
Case 1: (e′12, e′21) = (0, 0)
In this equilibrium, firms only operate domestically and there is no entry into interna-
tional markets either way. Hence we have
P ′1 = p
′
11 = 1, P
′
2 = p
′
22 = 2
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In this case we also have pi′ = 13 , and
pi′11 =
1
4
(1 + pi′)
pi′12 =
1
4
P ′1
p′12
(1 + pi′) =
1
8
(1 + pi′) =
1
8
4
3
=
1
6
≤ f12
pi′21 =
1
4
P ′2
p′21
(1 + pi′) =
1
2
(1 + pi′) =
2
3
≤ f21
pi′22 =
1
4
P ′2
p′22
=
1
4
(1 + pi′) =
1
3
Case 2: (e′12, e′21) = (0, 1)
In this equilibrium, country 2 firms enter (i.e. exports to) country 1 but not the other
way around. Hence we have
P ′1 = p
′
11 = 1, P
′
2 = [p
′−1
21 + p
′−1
22 ]
−1 =
2
3
In this case we have
pi′11 =
1
4
(1 + pi′)
pi′12 =
1
8
(1 + pi′)
pi′21 =
1
6
(1 + pi′)
pi′22 =
1
12
(1 + pi′)
Hence
pi′ =
1
3
− 2
3
f21
It is instructive to note that
pi′max =
1
3
, f21 = 0
pi′min =
1
5
, f21 =
1
5
In general
pi′21 =
1
8
(4
3
− 2
3
f21
)
=
1
6
− 1
12
f21 ≤ f12, forf21 ∈ (0, 1
5
)
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Case 3: (e′12, e′21) = (1, 0)
In this equilibrium, country 1 firms enter (i.e. exports to) country 2 but not the other
way around. Hence we have
P ′1 = [p
′−1
11 + p
′−1
12 ]
−1 =
2
3
, P ′2 = p
′
22 = 2
In this case we have
pi′11 =
1
6
(1 + pi′)
pi′12 =
1
12
(1 + pi′)
pi′21 =
1
2
(1 + pi′)
pi′22 =
1
4
(1 + pi′)
Hence
pi′ =
2+1+13
12 (1 + pi
′)− f12
2
=
1
3
− 2
3
f12
It is instructive to note that
pi′max =
1
3
, f12 = 0
pi′min =
5
24
(1 + pi′min)⇒ pi′min =
5
19
, f12 =
2
19
In general
pi′21 =
1
2
(4
3
− 2
3
f12
)
=
2
3
− 1
3
f12 ≤ f21, forf12 ∈ (0, 2
19
)
Case 4: (e12, e21) = (1, 1)
In this equilibrium, country 1 firms enter (i.e. exports to) country 2 and vice versa.
Hence we have
P ′1 = [p
′−1
11 + p
′−1
12 ]
−1 =
2
3
, P ′2 = [p
′−1
21 + p
′−1
22 ]
−1 =
2
3
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In this case we have
pi′11 =
1
6
(1 + pi′)
pi′12 =
1
12
(1 + pi′)
pi′21 =
1
6
(1 + pi′)
pi′22 =
1
12
(1 + pi′)
Hence
pi′ =
1
3
− 2
3
(f12 + f21)
pi′max =
1
3
, f12 = 0, f21 = 0
pi′min =
1
8
(1 + pi′min)⇒ pi′min =
1
7
, f21 =
1
6
8
7
=
4
21
, f12 =
1
12
8
7
=
2
21
In general
pi′12 =
1
12
(4
3
− 2
3
f12 − 2
3
f21
)
=
1
9
− 1
18
f12 − 1
18
f21 ≤ f12
pi′21 =
1
6
(4
3
− 2
3
f12 − 2
3
f21
)
=
2
9
− 1
9
f12 − 1
9
f21 ≤ f21
This implies
f12 ≤ 18
19
(1
9
− 1
18
f21
)
f21 ≤ 9
10
(2
9
− 1
9
f12
)
Hence the endpoints are {( 219 , 0), (0, 210)}.
A.3.4 Equilibria Pre- and Post-Reform
Given the characterization of the two previous sections, we can partition the f12 − f21
space into the following regions.
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Pre-reform, we have the five regions Pi, i = 0, 1, . . . , 4 where Pi corresponds to
the region that applies to the i-th case described earlier (e.g. P2 corresponds to
(e12, e21) = (0, 1)), and the 0-th case is the region in the parameter space where no
equilibria exist.
P1 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : f12 ≥ 1/12, f21 ≥ 2/3}
P2 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : f12 ≥ 1/12− 1/24f12, f21 ≤ 1/5}
P3 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : f21 ≥ 2/3− 1/3f12, f12 ≤ 2/31}
P4 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : f12 ≥ 30/31(2/30− 1/30f12), f21 ≥ 9/10(2/9− 1/9f12)}
P0 = R
2
+ \ {P1 ∪ P2 ∪ P3 ∪ P4}
Post-reform, the fixed cost space is partitioned into the following regions
Q1 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : f12 ≥ 1/6, f21 ≥ 2/3}
Q2 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : f12 ≥ 1/6− 1/12f12, f21 ≤ 1/5}
Q3 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : f21 ≥ 2/3− 1/3f12, f12 ≤ 2/19}
Q4 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : f12 ≥ 18/19(1/9− 1/18f12), f21 ≥ 9/10(2/9− 1/9f12)}
Q0 = R
2
+ \ {Q1 ∪Q2 ∪Q3 ∪Q4}
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Then combining these two partitions of the fixed-cost space, we get the following regions:
A11 = P1 ∩Q1 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : f12 ≥ 1/6, f21 ≥ 2/3}
A13 = P1 ∩Q3 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : 1/12 ≤ f12 ≤ 2/19, f21 ≥ 2/3}
A33 = P3 ∩Q3 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : f21 ≥ 2/3− 1/3f12, f12 ≤ 2/31}
A22 = P2 ∩Q2 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : f12 ≥ 1/6− 1/12f12, f21 ≤ 1/5}
A24 = P2 ∩Q4 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : f12 ≥ 1/12− 1/24f21, f21 ≤ 1/5}
∩ {(f12, f21) : f12 ≤ 18/19(1/9− 1/18f21), f21 ≤ 9/10(2/9− 1/9f12)}
A44 = P4 ∩Q4 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : f21 ≤ 9/10(2/9− 1/9f12), f12 ≥ 30/31(2/30− 1/30f12)}
A10 = P1 ∩Q0 = {(f12, f21) ∈ R2+ : 2/19 ≤ f12 ≤ 1/6, f21 ≥ 2/3}
A20 = P2 ∩Q0 = P2 \ {A24 ∪A22}
A03 = P0 ∩Q3 = Q3 \ {A33 ∪A13}
A04 = P0 ∩Q4 = Q4 \ {A44 ∪A24}
A12 = A14 = A21 = A23 = A31 = A32 = A34 = A41 = A42 = A43 = {}
A01 = A02 = A30 = A40 = {}
A00 = R
2
+ \ {A11 ∪A13 ∪A33 ∪A22 ∪A24 ∪A44 ∪A10 ∪A20 ∪A03 ∪A04}
Here Aij means that pre-reform, the equilibrium is Case i and post-reform, the equi-
librium is Case j for any (f12, f21) ∈ Aij . Note that there are many sets Aij that are
empty, in which case no exact equilibria exist, both pre- and post-reform. There are
two regionsregions Aij where i 6= j and i, j 6= 0: A24 and A13. These are interesting be-
cause they represent the equilibria where a change in entry patterns following the policy
reform. A13 means that after lowering the iceberg cost to export from 2 to 1, the entry
pattern changed from Case 1, i.e. (e12, e21) = (0, 0), to Case 3, i.e. (e12, e21) = (1, 0), so
the policy change induces country 2 to start exporting the differentiated good to 1, even
though firms from 1 still do not export to 2. The A24 equilibrium is analogous in that
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the policy induces firms from 2 to start exporting, but in this case, both before and after
the reform, firms from country 1 export to country 2. There are four nonempty sets Aii
where there is no change in the entry patterns after the reform, so we can expect the
effect of the extensive margin to be minimal. The other non-empty sets Aij have either
i = 0 or j = 0; this means that before or after the reform, equilibria may fail to exist.
A.3.5 The Algorithm at Work: An Approximate Equilibrium
As before, suppose there are two countries i = 1, 2. Each has a measure θi = wiLi
of firms that are considering which markets to enter. For simplicity consider only an
environment with trade (i.e. no multinational production). An example allowing for
multinational production is available upon request. International trade is subject to
both iceberg and fixed costs, which can be asymmetric across country pairs. Consider a
policy reform that lowers the iceberg costs for firms from 2 to export to 1 from τ12 = 2
to τ ′12 = 1. Let τ21 = τ ′21 = τ11 = τ ′11 = τ22 = τ ′22 = 1. The trade elasticity is σ = 2
and the expenditure share for the differentiated goods sector is µ = 1/2. The other
exogenous parameters are given below
w1 = 1, w2 = 1, L1 = 1, L2 = 1, φ1 = 2, φ2 = 1
This implies
p11 = p
′
11 = 1, p22 = p
′
22 = 2, p12 =
σ
σ − 1
w2τ12
φ2
= 4, p21 =
σ
σ − 1
w1τ21
φ1
= 1, p′12 =
σ
σ − 1
w2τ
′
12
φ2
= 2
Define
Q11 = µ
1
σ
(
p11
P1
)1−σ
= µ
1
σ
(
P1
p11
)
=
1
4
Q21 = µ
1
σ
(
p21
P2
)1−σ
= µ
1
σ
(
P2
p21
)
=
1
6
Q22 = µ
1
σ
(
p22
P2
)1−σ
= µ
1
σ
(
P2
p22
)
=
1
12
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Then
pi =
pi11 + pi21 + pi22 − 3
2
=
(
1
4 +
1
6 +
1
12
)
(1 + pi)− 3
2
=
1
3
− 2
Hence the restrictions are given by
piij > ⇔ Qij(1 + pi) > ⇔ Qij
(
4
3
− 2
)
> ⇔  <
4
3Qij
1 + 2Qij
Applied to the three relevant cases, this yields the restrictions
 <
1
3
1 + 12
=
2
9
 <
2
9
1 + 13
=
1
6
 <
1
9
1 + 16
=
2
21
Let  = 120 . Then we have pi =
1
3 − 110 = 730 . Then the baseline parameterization is
f12 = pi12 +  =
61
480
, f11 = f22 = f21 =  =
1
20
To show that there is no exact equilibrium after reform, note that either e′12 = 1 or
e′12 = 0.
Consider first the case with e′12 = 1. We have pi′ ∈ [13− 83 120 , 13 ], and P1 ∈ {2, 23} , depend-
ing on the entry decisions of other agents. If P ′1 = 2 and e′11 = 0, we must have pi′11 < f11
and pi′12 > f12. But pi′11 =
1
4
2
1(1 + pi
′) = 12(1 + pi
′) ≥ 12
(
4
3 − 83 120
)
= 915 >
1
20 = f11, a
contradiction. If, on the other hand, P ′1 =
2
3 and e
′
11 = 1, we must have pi
′
11 > f11 and
pi′12 > f12. But in this case we have pi′12 =
1
4
2
3
2 (1+pi
′) = 112(1+pi
′) ≤ 112 43 = 19 < 61480 = f12,
a contradiction. Hence there is no exact equilibrium when e′12 = 1.
Then for exact equilibrium to exist, we must have e′12 = 0. In this case we need only
consider the case when P ′ = 1 and e′11 = 1 because otherwise P ′1 = 0 (when e′11 = 0)
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and demand is not well-defined. If e′12 = 0, P ′ = 1, and e′11 = 1, we must have pi′11 > f11
and pi′12 < f12. But pi′12 =
1
4
1
2(1 + pi
′) ≥ 18
(
4
3 − 2 120
)
= 18
37
30 =
74
480 >
61
480 = f12, a
contradiction. Hence, exact equilibrium does not exist given this parameterization.
With no exact equilibrium, I now proceed to compute an approximate equilibrium.
As in the algorithm, define the sets
Ωi1 = {j : τ ′ij = τij , eij = 0}, Ωi2 = {j : τ ′ij = τij , eij = 1}
Ωi3 = {j : τ ′ij < τij , eij = 0}, Ωi4 = {j : τ ′ij < τij , eij = 1}
There are 4N = 8 sets. For this example these sets are
Ω11 = {}, Ω12 = {1}, Ω13 = {}, Ω14 = {2}
Ω21 = {}, Ω22 = {1, 2}, Ω23 = {}, Ω24 = {}
Suppose the initial cutoffs are kij = 100, ∀i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Given the cutoffs
we have that the guess for the post-reform entry patterns are given by
E =
 e′11 e′12
e′21 e′22
 =
 1 1
1 1

This yields P ′1 =
2
3 = P
′
2 and pi
′ = 13 − 83 = 15 . This in turn yields
pi′11 =
1
6
(1 + pi′) =
1
5
>
1
20
= f11
pi′12 =
1
12
(1 + pi′) =
1
10
<
61
480
= f12
pi′21 =
1
6
(1 + pi′) =
1
5
>
1
20
= f21
pi′22 =
1
12
(1 + pi′) =
1
10
>
1
20
= f22
Hence the equilibrium is only 75% accurate.
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There are no updates to the cutoffs of sets that are empty: k
(2)
11 = k
(2)
13 = k
(2)
21 =
k
(2)
23 = k
(2)
24 = 100 because Ωˆ
n
11 = Ωˆ
n
13 = Ωˆ
n
21 = Ωˆ
n
23 = Ωˆ
n
24 = {}. Further, Ωˆn12 =
{1}, Ωˆn14 = {}, Ωˆn22 = {1, 2} yields kn12 = 100, kn14 = 0, kn22 = 100. Let the Newton step be
λ = 0.2. Then the guess for the next iteration is k
(2)
12 = λk
n
12 + (1− λ)k(1)12 = 100, k(2)14 =
λkn14 + (1− λ)k(1)14 = 80, k(2)22 = 100.
Because k
(2)
12 = 80, we have
E(2) =
 e′(2)11 e′(2)12
e
′(2)
21 e
′(2)
22
 =
 1 0
1 1

Which yields P
′(2)
1 = 1, P
′(2)
2 =
2
3 and pi
′ = 730 . This in turn yields
pi′11 =
1
4
(1 + pi′) =
37
120
>
1
20
= f11
pi′12 =
1
8
(1 + pi′) =
74
480
>
61
480
= f12
pi′21 =
1
6
(1 + pi′) =
37
180
>
1
20
= f21
pi′22 =
1
12
(1 + pi′) =
37
360
>
1
20
= f22
As before, the equilibrium is only 75% accurate.
Likewise, there are no updates to the cutoffs of sets that are empty: k
(3)
11 = k
(3)
13 =
k
(3)
21 = k
(3)
23 = k
(3)
24 = 100 because Ωˆ
n
11 = Ωˆ
n
13 = Ωˆ
n
21 = Ωˆ
n
23 = Ωˆ
n
24 = {}. Further,
Ωˆn12 = {1}, Ωˆn14 = {2}, Ωˆn22 = {1, 2} yields kn12 = 100, kn14 = 100, kn22 = 100. Then the
guess for the next iteration is k
(3)
12 = λk
n
12 +(1−λ)k(2)12 = 100, k(3)14 = λkn14 +(1−λ)k(2)14 =
84, k
(3)
22 = 100.
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Because k
(3)
12 = 84, we have
E(3) =
 e′(3)11 e′(3)12
e
′(3)
21 e
′(3)
22
 =
 1 0
1 1

Resulting in the same price indices and dividend per share as the second iteration:
P
′(3)
1 = 1, P
′(3)
2 =
2
3 and pi
′ = 730 . Then as above we obtain k
(4)
12 = 100, k
(4)
14 =
λkn14 + (1− λ)k(3)14 = 87.2, k(4)22 = 100.
Iterating in this fashion, we find k
(t)
14 = λ · 100 + (1− λ)k(t−1)14 which implies
k
(t)
14 − k(t−1)14 = 0.2(100− k(t)14 )
⇒ k(t)14 > k(t−1)14 , ||k(t+1)14 − k(t)14 || < ||k(t)14 − k(t−1)14 ||
So that ||k(t)14 − k(t−1)14 || → 0 as t → ∞. Suppose we set the tolerance to be 0.1. Then
when does the iteration stop? We have
k
(5)
14 = λk
n
14 + (1− λ)k(4)14 = 89.60
k
(6)
14 = λk
n
14 + (1− λ)k(5)14 = 91.81
k
(7)
14 = λk
n
14 + (1− λ)k(6)14 = 93.45
. . .
k
(19)
14 = λk
n
14 + (1− λ)k(18)14 = 99.55
k
(20)
14 = λk
n
14 + (1− λ)k(19)14 = 99.64
And because ||k(20)14 − k(19)14 || < 0.1, the process stops and we settle on an approximate
equilibrium that is 75% accurate, which in this case is the highest percentage possible
given the number of available country pairs. It is easy to verify that the cutoffs for the
other sets remain unchanged in the iterations leading up to algorithmic termination.
